Innovative Methods and Procedures to Assess Counter-violent-radicalisation Techniques in Europe

Final report providing background for using and further developing the validated toolkit

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Executive summary

Objectives

The purpose of this deliverable is to present the results, outputs and lessons learned from the IMPACT Europe project. This project and its evaluation Toolkit provide a robust foundation for evaluating programmes and interventions for preventing and countering violent extremism (CVE). The project toolkit aims to be comprehensible and useful for all potentially interested practitioners (e.g. multi-level end-users, first-line practitioners, policymakers and other decision makers). This report presents the findings, lessons learned and recommendations produced by the IMPACT Europe programme, which include – but are not limited to – our toolkit.

This deliverable plays an intermediary role between dissemination and research by defining a robust methodology while also being easily understood by potential users, taking into account their level of involvement and specific focus (e.g. between ‘post-research’ and ‘pre-dissemination’).

A key task was to consider how the toolkit would perform in changing future environments, such as new and evolving threats, new legal frameworks, continuing digitalisation of society (e.g. increasing online activity by actors in the field). This deliverable provides a set of recommendations for further developing and implementing the innovative evaluation toolkit.

Results and conclusions

We found that IMPACT Europe’s main result is a more robust and quasi-standardised mode of measuring effectiveness, broadly defining and evaluating programmes and interventions. The toolkit can help end-users, from policymakers to first-line practitioners, from the perspective of respective needs. This leads to the specification of evaluation programmes, which is carried out according to core evaluation principles and procedures. It can also help them to attain the minimum level of required data on assessment results in a structured and robust way. In a way, while IMPACT Europe is representative, with ambition and seriousness, of current knowledge and understanding, we identified paths for future developments.

For the toolkit itself, we recommend exploring a number of options. These could include developing a greater level of granularity of coding variable categories and options in future iterations, or considering new evaluation such as social media analysis. Regarding what we term the ‘CVE state of the art’, we recommend the application of unused theoretical approaches and operational practices to CVE programmes and their evaluation.

Key project information

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Table of Contents

Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................ v
Abstract ............................................................................................................................... vii

Purpose .............................................................................................................................. vii
Methods .............................................................................................................................. vii
Results ............................................................................................................................... vii
Conclusions ........................................................................................................................ vii

1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1
   1.1. Purpose of report ................................................................................................. 1
       1.1.1. Post-research ............................................................................................. 1
       1.1.2. Pre-dissemination ...................................................................................... 1
       1.1.3. Cohesiveness, lessons learned and next steps ........................................... 2
       1.1.4. Structure overview ..................................................................................... 2

2. Why IMPACT Europe? ................................................................................................. 5
   2.1. IMPACT Europe and EU strategic policy ........................................................... 5
       2.1.1. IMPACT Europe and EU strategic policy .................................................. 5
       2.1.2. Previous innovative efforts ........................................................................ 5
   2.2. The policy trend: from understanding radicalisation to CVE ............................ 5
       2.2.1. The EU’s pioneering role .......................................................................... 5
       2.2.2. EU support for CVE research projects ...................................................... 6
   2.3. Necessity of IMPACT Europe ............................................................................. 7
       2.3.1. IMPACT Europe’s role in filling in the gaps ............................................. 7
       2.3.2. IMPACT Europe’s role in introducing evaluation to the field of CVE ...... 11

3. IMPACT Europe overview ........................................................................................ 13
   3.1. Analysis of the state of the art (WP2) .................................................................. 13
       3.1.1. Challenges .................................................................................................. 13
       3.1.2. Findings and solutions ............................................................................... 14
   3.2. Developing a toolkit prototype (WP3) .................................................................. 14
       3.2.1. Challenges .................................................................................................. 15
       3.2.2. Findings and solutions ............................................................................... 17
   3.3. Developing a manual and training course (WP4) ............................................... 18
       3.3.1. Challenges .................................................................................................. 18
       3.3.2. Findings and solutions ............................................................................... 18
   3.4. Piloting the toolkit (WP5) .................................................................................... 19
3.4.1. Challenges ................................................................................................. 20
3.4.2. Findings and solutions............................................................................... 21
3.5. Refining and stress-testing the toolkit (WP6) .............................................. 21
4. IMPACT Europe utility .................................................................................... 23
  4.1. IMPACT Europe toolkit for policymakers .................................................. 23
  4.2. IMPACT Europe for researchers ................................................................. 23
  4.3. IMPACT Europe for practitioners ............................................................... 24
    4.3.1. IMPACT Europe for commissioners ..................................................... 24
    4.3.2. IMPACT Europe for evaluators ............................................................ 25
    4.3.3. IMPACT Europe for implementers ....................................................... 25
5. Toolkit adaptability ......................................................................................... 27
  5.1. Producing knowledge .................................................................................. 27
  5.2. Dynamics of understanding: towards maturity? ......................................... 27
  5.3. Sustainability of the toolkit .......................................................................... 28
    5.3.1. Toolkit adaptability: an assessment ...................................................... 28
    5.3.2. Recommendations ............................................................................... 30
    5.3.3. Breakthrough innovations ................................................................... 31
  5.4. Unused theoretical corpora and epistemic practices .................................... 32
    5.4.1. Alternative approach to countering violent extremism: restorative justice 33
    5.4.2. Alternative approach to countering violent extremism: internet addiction prevention 34
    5.4.3. Alternative approach to countering violent extremism: exit counselling 35
    5.4.4. CVE and ethical questions .................................................................. 36
6. Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 41
References ........................................................................................................... 43
1. Annex 1 – Assessing how the toolkit would stand the test of time .................. 45
  1.1. Introduction ................................................................................................. 45
  1.2. Methodology ............................................................................................... 45
    1.2.1. Methodology: an approach based on the principles of scenario development 45
    1.2.2. Stage 1: Mapping out the possible future environment ......................... 46
    1.2.3. Stage 2: Identifying how the toolkit would accommodate different future factors 49
    1.2.4. Stage 3: Developing initial suggestions ............................................... 50
    1.2.5. Stage 4: Final validation ....................................................................... 50
  1.3. Findings ..................................................................................................... 50
1.4. Conclusions and recommendations ................................................................. 63
1.4.1. Conclusions .............................................................................................. 63
1.4.2. Recommendations .................................................................................. 64
References ........................................................................................................... 67
Factors Matrix ....................................................................................................... 69

2. Annex 2 – Targeted update of evaluations ....................................................... 87
2.1. Exploration of updated WP2 evaluations ....................................................... 87
2.2. Alternative approaches to interventions and evaluations ......................... 89
2.2.1. Alternative approach to countering violent extremism: restorative justice 89
2.2.2. Alternative approach to evaluation: programme theory ....................... 90
2.3. Future suggestions .................................................................................... 91
References ........................................................................................................... 93

3. Annex 3 – WP6. New insights for CVE strategies from other sectors of policy:
restorative justice and internet addiction prevention ........................................... 95
3.1. Introduction ................................................................................................ 95
3.2. Internet addiction prevention approaches .................................................. 95
3.2.1. Internet addiction theories ...................................................................... 95
3.2.2. Internet addiction prevention: approaches and interventions ............... 96
3.3. Restorative justice strategies ...................................................................... 103
3.3.1. Restorative justice theories and principles ............................................ 104
3.3.2. Restorative justice tools and interventions .......................................... 105
3.3.3. Assumptions and hypotheses of the utility of RG prevention in the CVE field 106
References ......................................................................................................... 109
Abbreviations

CBRN-E  Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives
CCSA  Canadian Center on Substance Abuse
CSAP-SAMHSA  Center for Substance Abuse Prevention
CVE  Countering Violent Extremism
EMCDDA  European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
EU  European Union
FP7  Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development
HLC  High Level Conference
IMPACT Europe  Innovative Method and Procedure to Assess Counter-violent-radicalisation Techniques in Europe
IAD  Internet Addiction Disorder
MOE  Measures of Effectiveness
MOP  Measures of Performance
MS  Member State
NEET  Not in Education, Employment or Training
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation
NIDA  National Institute on Drug Abuse
RAN  Radicalisation Awareness Network
VOM  Victim-Offender Mediation
VORP  Victim-Offender Reconciliation Programme
WP  Work Package
Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this deliverable is to present the results of IMPACT Europe, covering findings, lessons learned and recommendations produced by the project. These include, but are not limited to, the project evaluation toolkit. This programme and its toolkit provide a robust foundation for evaluating programmes and interventions for preventing and countering violent extremism (CVE). The project toolkit aims to be comprehensible and useful for all potentially interested practitioners (e.g. multi-level end-users, first-line practitioners, policymakers and other decision makers). A key task under WP6 was that of assessing the adaptability of the toolkit, i.e. how the toolkit would perform in changing future environments, such as new and evolving threats, new legal frameworks, and a continuing digitalisation of society (e.g. increasing use of online activity by actors in the field). This deliverable provides a set of recommendations for further developing and implementing the innovative evaluation toolkit.

Methods

An interdisciplinary team produced this deliverable, which provides a synthesis and overview of a variety of research activities. First, the project team reflected on the results of the toolkit’s pilot programme and ways of enhancing the toolkit, as well as the accompanying manual and training course. In parallel, the research team also evaluated the toolkit’s adaptability in a changing environment. Finally the team delivered the present report discussing lessons learned, findings and recommendations for future work.

Results

We found the IMPACT Europe toolkit to be a robust and quasi-standardised set of tools for measuring effectiveness, broadly defining and evaluating programmes and interventions. The toolkit has the potential to help a variety of end-users with differing needs, ranging from policymakers to first-line practitioners. It has the potential to remain valid in the medium term, although some improvements might be made and unexplored theoretical fields and practices taken into account in future through a similarly robust protocol.

Conclusions

IMPACT Europe and its toolkit facilitate the selection and implementation of evidence-based response measures, with the goal of eventually contributing to the design of better, more focused policy programmes and interventions. Stakeholders may find useful information on identifying good or promising practices in tackling violent extremism in IMPACT Europe. It may also enable, to a significant extent, the management of knowledge that is necessary for building an evidence base.
1. Introduction

1.1. Purpose of report

The purpose of this deliverable, within Work Package (WP) 6, is to contribute to and present the results and interests of the IMPACT Europe programme and the elaborated toolkit, which provides a robust foundation for evaluating programmes and interventions that counter violent extremism.

The report is designed to accompany and prolong our team’s current and future research efforts throughout the programme’s course. It aims to be comprehensible and useful for the diverse range of potentially interested individuals through the findings, lessons learned, and recommendations produced by the IMPACT Europe programme, which include – but are not limited to – our toolkit.

1.1.1. Post-research

This report should play an intermediary role between meeting the methodological requirements of robust research (the definition of a protocol, meta-analysis, technical and ethical challenges, data protection, calibration of terms of reference, fighting against multiple biases, etc.) and the need to be easily understood by potential users. This intermediary role is at the heart of research programs financed by the EU, and is applicable to IMPACT Europe.

1.1.2. Pre-dissemination

This report also contributes to the dissemination phase – a key determinant of IMPACT Europe’s success. The elucidation of ‘scientific machinery’ for potential users, no matter their task, level of competency or practice, is necessary for the removal from the system of any scientific jargon, which has been identified as a limitation on its accessibility. This ‘machinery’ must also be practically applicable.

The objectives of researchers are sometimes too far removed from, or even contradictory to, those of practitioners. Some are interested in ‘why’ while others need to know ‘how’. The first group may try to understand the association between different types of social, psychological, anthropological, cultural or religious variables in order to describe the process of violent radicalisation. The second group looks for robust operational methods that offer concrete means of helping their beneficiaries to distance themselves from violent ideology. IMPACT Europe aims to prevent the manifestation of violent extremism among individuals or groups, and to stop any mitigating effects such as recidivism, regardless of the name given to these efforts or the methods used (e.g. disengagement, deradicalisation, or recidivism prevention). To that end, the IMPACT programme, since its inception, has adopted an intermediary approach that accommodates both scientific requirements and the requirement for applicability for first-line practitioners.
1.1.3. Cohesiveness, lessons learned and next steps

Sitting between the post-research and pre-dissemination phases, this report aims to show:

- The degree of cohesiveness of the IMPACT Europe programme and the extent to which it is balanced in its approach and action;
- The lessons learned from the program, the consortium and team, and the different work packages (WP);
- The limits and possible next steps in developing the IMPACT Europe toolkit in regards understanding, operational practices, future needs, and the possible evolution of different forms of violent extremism (jihadism, far right extremism, far left extremism, violent ethno-separatism, etc.);
- The level of practicality of the programme for practitioners, including avoiding the usage of jargon (particularly scientific jargon).

This report was written under the direction of Jean-Luc Marret, a researcher, former social worker, and designer/director of a programme that attempts to prevent recurrent jihadism in Syrian prisons. The co-authors are all researchers working on violent extremism and programme evaluation. Finally, commentaries, remarks, and suggestions were made by many practising and operational members of our advisory board. We thank them for their contribution.

1.1.4. Structure overview

This report begins by explaining the reasons why the IMPACT Europe programme is needed to support and prolong the EU’s pioneering efforts on prevention and CVE (Part 2), and by assessing methods and good evaluation practices (a critical and mandatory phase in any CVE intervention) (Part 3). Our programme will be contrasted with EU efforts and Member States’ policies (at the national and local level, both public and private).

Next, the report presents the results and good practices of the IMPACT Europe programme (Part 4), focusing in particular on the following macro aspects: analysing state-of-the-art (WP2) radicalisation studies, CVE practices and evaluation approaches in developing a toolkit prototype (WP3); developing a manual and training course (including a train-the-trainer component) (WP4); piloting the toolkit (WP5) and finally, refining and stress-testing the toolkit (WP6).

The report then presents the contribution IMPACT Europe has made to first-line practitioners and those interested in CVE interventions. In doing so it defines three types of factor: strategic (or managerial/political), mid-(meso-) level correspondence pertaining to managing and designing programmes and interventions, and micro-level correspondence for direct first-line practitioners (Part 4). Our team takes the view that CVE programmes demand

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1 We define evaluation as an evidence-based judgement of the extent to which an intervention has been effective, efficient and relevant, given its objectives and the needs it seeks to address. It is a tool to assess whether an action is delivering the expected results and the extent to which results might reasonably be credited to the action.
division of work and needs, including the duties and needs of our end-users, according to a hierarchical model.

Finally, regarding the future of CVE practices and knowledge about radicalisation, the report analyses the toolkit’s adaptability on a 5-to-10 year timeline through possible scenarios, unexplored theoretical fields, and possible modes of action (Part 5).
2. Why IMPACT Europe?

2.1. IMPACT Europe and EU strategic policy

2.1.1. IMPACT Europe and EU strategic policy

The IMPACT Europe programme should be considered a scientific contribution to an operational goal of advancing research that is useful to practitioners in the domain of preventing and countering violent extremism (CVE) – a goal which is supported by the European Union (EU) and its Member States (MS). More specifically, the programme is representative of innovative efforts made by the EU in this area and builds on the results and findings of other on-going efforts or of programmes conducted in this space over previous years.

2.1.2. Previous innovative efforts

More specifically, the programme is representative of innovative efforts made by the EU over previous years. It complements its existing vision while benefitting from the EU’s substantial investment as a global soft-power actor.

The EU, by supporting programs like IMPACT Europe, through its Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP7) or Horizon 2020, has largely contributed to the formation of European networks of fundamental or applied research. In doing so, the EU supports states in creating their own public policy concerning CVE, including the utilisation of practitioner networks such as the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN).

In the field of CVE, these research efforts have also contributed and continue to contribute to a more thorough and scientifically-based comprehension of the phenomenon of radicalisation. In this context, IMPACT Europe and its consortium complement the EU’s existing vision in the field of research and CVE. The programme’s underlying rationale has emerged from past studies in the field. These include studies on the nature of radicalisation and its different forms, as well as both the development of an understanding regarding the methods and promising practices employed in counter-radicalisation initiatives. IMPACT Europe, meanwhile, focuses on evaluations of such interventions and programmes.

2.2. The policy trend: from understanding radicalisation to CVE

The EU’s support of European research has been accompanied by the emergence of policy strategies and programmes in many Member States.

2.2.1. The EU’s pioneering role

The EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2005 (revised in 2008 and 2014) elaborated on its main principles with regard to countering terrorism. The Strategy holds that civil society has a crucial role to play in tackling and countering violent radicalisation, while recognising that
any action taken against violent radicalisation is first and foremost the responsibility of Member States. This dual emphasis on both civil actors and Member States reflects the diversity of European societies and national models of producing public policy – certain Member States, based on their individual characteristics and preferences, favour a local, decentralised approach such as that employed in Germany; meanwhile other countries, such as France, take a more centralised, top-down approach.

EU strategy has also stressed the necessity of coordinating policies across Member States, encouraging the exchange of information, the dissemination of good practices and the emergence of new ideas. In 2011, this led to the creation of the Radicalisation Awareness Network, a multi-actor European network which comprises a wide array of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), security sector actors, local first-line practitioners, and policymakers. Furthermore, the first High Level Conference (HLC) of the European Commission, on 15 January 2014, adopted a Communication on 'Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism'. The Communication recommended the adoption by the EU and Member States of many joint priorities, including the necessity to create a national policy in each country consisting of prevention strategies and practitioner networks relating to the RAN.

In June 2014, the Council adopted the ‘Revised EU Strategy on Radicalisation’, which emphasised the importance of transmitting good practices – particularly in civil society and other specific sectors like education and prisons – financing research on radicalisation and its evolution, and formalising strong ties between researchers and practitioners.

2.2.2. EU support for CVE research projects

Financial support from the Commission that goes towards different research projects (examples below) illustrates the EU’s strong commitment to developing its understanding of radicalisation:

- The European Network of Deradicalisation (www.european-network-of-deradicalisation.eu) attempts to develop ties between researchers and operators in order to provide practical protocol guidelines.

- The SAFIRE project has influenced the understanding of radicalisation, which it defines as ‘a multivariable and nonlinear procedure that can concern anyone, result in physical or verbal violence, yet which is reversible at any moment’.

- The ‘Formers and Family’ project develops guidelines for interventions and programmes that involve families and their former-radical members with the goal of preventing radicalisation.

- The CoPPRa I and CoPPRa II projects (www.coppra.eu) attempted to develop practical tools such as training and e-learning programmes.

- Regarding early detection, ‘Improving Security by Democratic Participation’ provided tools that helped detect and respond to signs of radicalisation (www.isdep.eu/content/462/what-is-isdep).
- The ‘Victim’s Counter-Terrorism Gathering: the Voice of Survivors Against Radicalisation’ programme developed visual materials for counter-narratives (Counternarration4Counterterrorism).

- The CoCoRa project aims to develop a prevention strategy in close collaboration with local communities that may be targeted by violent extremists (http://cocoraproject.eu/).

- An audiovisual project entitled the European Platform of Deradicalisation Narratives created a database of narratives, training materials, and good practices.

- All of these projects contributed to increased dialogue between epistemic and first-line practitioners, and in doing so augmented the impact of both groups. In addition, the initiatives developed for this principal goal (as well as the RAN and its ‘Formers and Families’ project) established an online resource for families, known as the European Policy and Practices Exchange Portal (www.counterextremism.org).

The EU has supported, continuously and in a variety of forms, the development of knowledge and practices in the CVE domain. In this context, IMPACT Europe provides supplementary contributions through tools and resources that will facilitate the evaluation of programs and interventions – a fundamental aspect of research and operational plans.

2.3. Necessity of IMPACT Europe

Both in general and in the specifically European context of CVE, the IMPACT Europe program has a unique role. It has contributed to filling some operational and research gaps (Section 2.3.1). More importantly, the project aimed to introduce evaluation to a policy area where robust and rigorous evaluations have not yet become the norm (Section 2.3.2).

2.3.1. IMPACT Europe’s role in filling in the gaps

This section explores the three core knowledge and capability gaps: the lack of identified promising practice, the absence of a standardised methodology for identifying such practice, and insufficient knowledge and understanding of evaluation practice among end-users.

Knowledge and capability gap #1: We do not know what promising practice in tackling violent radicalisation is

To date, very few CVE programmes have been assessed and the assessments that have taken place have not been robust. This is due to a number of factors. First, many assessments are not transparent about the methodology used and any limitations. Second, although more transparent assessments have taken place, often the indicators have not

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2 We define evaluation as an evidence-based judgement of the extent to which an intervention has been effective and efficient and relevant, given the needs and its objectives. It is a tool to assess whether an action is actually delivering the expected results and how much might reasonably be credited to the action. See: European Commission (2015).

3 Romaniuk (2015); van Hemert et al. (2014); Disley et al. (2011); Rabasa et al. (2010); Horgan and Braddock (2010).
comprehensively represented the issues relating to violent radicalisation or been coherent from one programme to the next. Third, these evaluations often lack empirical evidence. Fourth, the assessments have tended to focus on short-term outputs as opposed to long-term outcomes and impacts, yet the latter are essential to understanding the link between programmes and the overall goal of reducing the threat from violent extremism. Fifth, few assessments have involved a control group or a benchmark to understand whether the identified changes are attributable to the programme or a confounding factor. Sixth, almost no evaluations address the issue of costs, cost implications and value for money of CVE interventions.

These six shortcomings mean that there is limited knowledge of promising practice in tackling violent radicalisation and few lessons to inform the design and implementation of new programmes.4

The lack of assessment is particularly problematic given that CVE programmes vary widely, making promising practices all the more challenging to identify. The main characteristics on which programmes vary include:5

- The population of interest: evidence suggests that programmes can target populations based on ideology (e.g. violent right-wing, radical Islamist etc.) or based on other elements including age and gender.

- The timing of the programme: CVE programmes might be entirely preventive in nature and include the discussion of extremism and human rights in schools; they may target at-risk populations on the basis of their marginalisation in society; some programmes also take place in prison settings, amongst individuals who have already committed violent acts. Deradicalisation programmes may aim for a change in behaviour – away from violence – or a change in attitudes and beliefs – away from violent extremism.

- The programme activities: programmes may be based on cohesion and integration activity (broad interfaith and anti-racism education projects, social work, social forums, mentoring young people); counselling activity (identification and referral of people, safe space projects to address grievances); counter-narrative activity (speakers challenging terrorist narratives); and capacity-building activity, amongst others.

- The method of the programme: governments, agencies, and NGOs have developed a vast range of intervention methods from one-to-one mentoring and group activities to media training and education. The main methods include: mentoring and individual-based programmes; law enforcement; citizenship training and education; sport; debating and challenging ideological, theological or social beliefs; communications training; and internet and digital literacy training.

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4 Home Office (2009); Ajzen (1985); Ajzen (2002); Ajzen (2005); Ajzen (2012).
5 Reding et al. (2011); Rabasa et al. (2010); Horgan and Braddock (2010).
The provider of the programme: strategies and policies are developed by supra-national institutions and central governments, local government actions and non-governmental organisations.

The context in which the programme is carried out: external factors such as foreign policy or reputation can significantly affect the likelihood of success of a programme at any given point.

In order to identify promising practice, IMPACT Europe promotes the evaluation of programmes tackling violent radicalisation and the identification of promising practice on the basis of evaluation results:

- The IMPACT Europe Toolkit emphasises a good understanding of an intervention as a pre-condition for planning a successful evaluation, as characteristics of the CVE intervention affect the choice of evaluation methods.
- The IMPACT Europe Toolkit includes the evaluation results database which helps end-users understand why some programmes are effective and others are not, and to identify promising practice in tackling violent radicalisation.
- The consortium’s training, communication, and dissemination activities helped raise awareness of evaluation and make stakeholders aware of its importance, and empowered the stakeholders to plan their evaluations and spread this message themselves.

Knowledge and capability gap #2: There is no standardised methodology for identifying promising practice

The complexity of assessing CVE programmes means that only a systematic and standardised analysis can provide a robust answer to ‘what works’ in countering violent extremism. At present, end-users do not have a shared understanding of what evaluation is or a standardised methodology to evaluate programmes and identify promising practice. This is partly due to the fact that there are:

- Different types of evaluation approaches (including counterfactual, theory-driven\(^6\) and realist);\(^7\)
- Diverse motivations and purposes for conducting an evaluation (e.g. learning, strengthening institutional capacities or relationships with stakeholders, accountability);
- Various pragmatic considerations which affect the choice of a suitable evaluation methodology.

While there is no single evaluation approach which could be applied in all contexts and circumstances and for all purposes, this does not mean that a standardised methodology

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\(^6\) Leeuw (2003); Weiss (1995).
\(^7\) Pawson and Tilley (1997).
cannot be developed. There is a significant degree of consensus with respect to core evaluation principles and procedures.\(^8\)

- Ethical considerations and human rights form a basis for sound evaluations: in the European context, all evaluations should be designed and conducted in accordance with the rights and principles set out in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Compliance of CVE interventions with human rights should be assessed as part of the evaluation, alongside a number of ethical issues that need to be considered.

- The logic model is a core and helpful concept in the evaluation field: any intervention will entail an input (e.g. the amount being invested, staff responsible to do it and time for delivery), an activity (actions needed to implement it), an output (the direct products of the activity), and outcomes and impacts. An outcome consists of the longer-term result of an activity. An impact can be defined as the result of an activity which materialises at a later point in time than the outcome. Importantly, outputs, outcomes and impacts do not always materialise as expected, and may carry unexpected consequences, both positive and negative.

- The following steps are found in the majority of evaluations: designing an evaluation (i.e. identifying the purpose, defining evaluation questions); detailing an evaluation approach and methods; collecting and analysing data, and arriving at a judgement; drawing conclusions and recommendations; disseminating evaluation results; and following up recommended changes or improvements.\(^9\)

In order to introduce a standardised methodology for identifying promising practice, IMPACT Europe developed a toolkit that promotes core evaluation principles and procedures in CVE evaluation by:

- Drawing the attention of end-users to how different actors are affected through an intervention, and whether and how their interests and views are addressed in an evaluation – particular attention is paid to conducting an evaluation in line with ethical norms and with respect to human rights;

- Providing end-users with interactive and customised advice at each step of the evaluation process – from planning through to following up evaluation recommendations;

- Explaining and guiding end-users through the process of developing a logic model and a theory of change to help them understand how an intervention is meant to work.

\(^8\) Rossi et al. (2004).
Knowledge and capability gap #3: Not all end-users have the knowledge and understanding necessary to design and carry out evaluations that are appropriate to their programmes

A significant proportion of end-users lack the capacity to design and carry out evaluations that are appropriate to their programmes. At present, programme evaluations are lacking in transparency, primary data and hard evidence, rather than just theory or logic. While some evaluations take place within the realm of classified information, they do not contribute to identifying promising practice at the EU level.

End-users have limited understanding of evaluation and limited relevant expertise. There is a considerable level of distrust towards evaluation and a concern that it is a yet another control mechanism leading to cuts in future funding should the results of an evaluation be unfavourable. Evaluation is not seen as a useful tool which can point to what is done well and what can be improved. However, the evaluation of CVE work may provide suggestions on:

- How to achieve better outcomes;
- How to achieve the same results for less (or better value for money);
- What changes are necessary to keep up with the dynamic contexts and evolving needs and objectives in this field.

A base level of knowledge and understanding of evaluation is therefore essential to strengthen end-users’ ability to design, conduct or participate in evaluations that can be helpful to their programmes.

In order to introduce knowledge and understanding of evaluation, IMPACT Europe developed the capacity of end-users with respect to designing and conducting evaluations:

- We developed a training course (and train-the-trainer module) to build the knowledge and capacity of end-users to design and carry out evaluations.
- We developed a training manual for end-users’ ease of reference when seeking to refresh their knowledge and capacity in designing and carrying out evaluations.
- We made the manual available through the IMPACT toolkit – the knowledge-management tool to build evaluation capacity and introduce evaluation to the field of CVE.

2.3.2. IMPACT Europe’s role in introducing evaluation to the field of CVE

The IMPACT Europe project and its toolkit address the deficiencies identified above in three ways:

- By encouraging end-users/practitioners to think about their own intervention(s) and consider other relevant interventions through the toolkit;
• By improving commitment and knowledge in evaluating CVE interventions and the development of a body of evidence in the future;
• By providing preliminary answers to the aforementioned three emerging questions and to decrease the prevalence of violent extremism in our societies.

The IMPACT Europe Toolkit is a knowledge-management tool designed to facilitate the planning and conduct of evaluations within the field of CVE in both the short and long term. In the short term, the toolkit will assist end-users, helping them benefit from the evaluation methods and approaches it contains. In the long term, the toolkit seeks to help generate much-needed empirical evidence on what makes CVE interventions more or less effective and on how to further improve interventions in order to decrease the prevalence of violent extremism in our societies.
3. IMPACT Europe overview

This chapter discusses IMPACT Europe’s research and delivery process, using its WPs or macro-activities as the main unit of focus. The purpose of the chapter is to present the project approach and discuss challenges confronted, results obtained and lessons learned.

Overall, in order to reduce the knowledge and capacity gaps that limit the effectiveness of end-users' activity in the CVE field, IMPACT Europe developed an online evaluation toolkit supported by a training course and manual.

3.1. Analysis of the state of the art (WP2)

At the start of our project, the project team collected and analysed information on the state of empirical understanding regarding radicalisation phenomena and processes that interventions are expected to address. On this point, IMPACT Europe contributed by raising the bar on understanding of radicalisation. Above all, we analysed state-of-the-art tactics and programmes for violent radicalisation interventions. In order to accurately reflect the extreme diversity of the body of theory used to comprehend radicalisation’s many forms and conditions, we adopted a multidisciplinary approach informed by psychology, psychiatry, anthropology, sociology and a range of social sciences.

Currently, understanding of the complex phenomenon of radicalisation is the subject of a major scientific effort, which reflects societal demand and the sensitivity of the topic of terrorism. IMPACT Europe contributed by presenting and synthesising the efforts of numerous epistemic research communities. A new field of knowledge emerged less than fifteen years ago, consisting of studies using the keyword ‘radicalisation’ – although it is possible to find some precursors in studies of political violence or terrorism, or less directly in psychology, psycho-sociology, sociology and anthropology.

3.1.1. Challenges

The selection and treatment of selected sources was done in a limited number of languages, because:

- The majority of sources are in English, a common language which facilitates scientific exchange (and is overrepresented among international peer-reviewed publications);
- The team primarily used European languages (English, German, Dutch, French, Italian), or more specifically western European languages.
As the objective of the IMPACT Europe programme is to help practitioners, we have chosen to centre our meta-analytical research on a narrow definition of ‘radicalisation’, and on interventions and correlating programmes.\(^\text{10}\)

It should be noted that this programme is unclassified for the sake of promoting awareness. Consequently, it was not possible to select and present work or programmes that are classified in our assessment of the state of the art.

Analysing state-of-the-art radicalisation studies, a field which is currently in the process of becoming defined, enabled our team to track which methods and metrics that are currently used, or could be used, to assess various interventions tackling violent radicalisation. Our goal here was to provide end-users with tools to:

- Identify and isolate some specific variables leading to violent radicalisation (for instance lack of self-esteem, poor anger management), with the assumption that some programmes and interventions can impact on this;
- Identify programmes and interventions that could be considered CVE or are closely related (for example gang prevention programmes in the U.S.);
- Identify the intervention logic that underpins a CVE programme: scientific base, inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, etc.

3.1.2. Findings and solutions

We have produced a vast representation of hundreds of references on radicalisation and intervention programmes, including robust and scientific selection criteria, with a focus on Europe and North America (due to linguistic accessibility) and on operational CVE practices. The under-representation of references in Arabic and current Arab-led CVE interventions is due partly to linguistic factors, but also to a lack of communication, references and disseminated scientific evaluations emerging from interventions and programmes in Arabic-speaking countries.

Consequently, while the question of understanding and practice evolution is addressed to some extent here, the IMPACT Europe programme is focused more on identifying elements and methods of evaluation than on observing hyper-innovative, marginal, alternative, or minor emerging factors. Above all, IMPACT Europe contributes towards the diffusion of CVE evaluation practices rather than providing a tool for detecting the emergence of new understandings. The latter aspect was nonetheless taken into account to a certain degree as our team sought to evaluate the adaptability of our toolkit to future needs.

3.2. Developing a toolkit prototype (WP3)

Whilst developing our online evaluation toolkit, the project team’s main objective was to introduce evaluation to a policy area where robust and rigorous evaluations have not yet become the norm. To this end, we built on the findings of previous analysis of the state of

\(^{10}\) See the WP2 final deliverable for description of the research protocol and semantic enquiry.
the art as regards programmes tackling violent radicalisation and methods to evaluate their effectiveness. In light of the limited empirical evidence available on CVE intervention and evaluation practices, we complemented our analysis of the state of the art by:

- Exploring intervention designs and established evaluation practices identified in other relevant (and more advanced) fields of research;
- Engaging with practitioners active in the field of CVE.

3.2.1. Challenges

Two workshops with CVE practitioners helped identify the issues that need to be considered when designing evaluations for CVE interventions. The workshops indicated how the toolkit design could help end-users. In particular:

- End-users would particularly benefit from assistance in measuring the long-term effects of their interventions (and to a lesser extent short-term effects). The toolkit should allow end-users to access information about the most relevant evaluations for these aims by making accessible the relevant database categories for intervention and evaluation.
- The CVE database includes details of the sources used in its compilation, and toolkit users will be directed to published outputs. Improving the knowledge base for end-users in this way helps to address another area highlighted as being important.
- The organisation of the CVE database should allow end-users to:
  a. Distinguish between interventions targeted at groups and/or individuals and allow for searching for either or both, depending on end-users’ requirements;
  b. Identify how evaluation data could be gathered and how trust was generated among evaluation participants – knowing this can help end-users in gathering data for their own evaluations.
- There is a wealth of information in the relational part of the CVE database. This will allow the extraction of complex linkages between the motivation of actors, and the mechanisms and activities of the interventions.

As such, the richness of the data in the CVE database and the complexity of the relationships it contains allow many options for its exploration. Moreover, the workshops have played an important role in helping the IMPACT Europe team to identify some of the most useful ways of making it accessible in the toolkit.

In preparation for developing the evaluation toolkit, we have carried out a targeted review of existing online resources related to evaluation. We considered this a necessary step to inspire our thinking and help us recognise potential synergies with available resources. That said, we aimed to develop a toolkit that offers something unique compared to the current available resources. We found that there is a space for the IMPACT Europe toolkit to fill, both in terms of CVE-specific content and wider innovations. While there is a wealth of online resources dedicated to individual research instruments (e.g. survey design), there are
few that are freely available and provide an outline and structure while guiding users through the entire evaluation process (from designing it to using evaluation results). These online tools tend to be comprised of generic guidelines that could be applied to any policy area, as well as resources dedicated to specific fields (e.g. education, health, community development).

Despite the wide variety of these toolkits, we have identified a number of common characteristics:

- The tasks are clustered around different stages of evaluation (from planning and managing through to conduct and follow-up). The toolkits often distinguish between: a) external and internal evaluation, b) evaluation focused on implementation issues and outcomes, and c) data collection, analysis and reporting.

- Many toolkits use logic model or programme theory approaches in framing evaluations. However, only a limited number explicitly deal with contribution and attribution.

- A brief description of evaluation instruments is made available with references to additional resources. The number of instruments presented in toolkits varies from a few to over 30.

- Examples of evaluation tools and checklists are often provided as supporting material. They are made available through links to other websites or uploaded documents.

- Most toolkits include a menu of options for users to browse and choose from. Only one toolkit provides an additional function – a structured questionnaire for users – to facilitate the choice of evaluation approach and instruments, and to make users aware of their implications.

- Very few toolkits elaborate on ethical issues related to evaluation.

While many of these provide common and often comprehensive guidance on the evaluation process, none is specifically tailored to evaluating CVE interventions.11

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11 In the area of radicalisation we have found some free online resources that could help design the inspiration platform (second level of the CVR evaluation toolkit). These include: Urban Securipedia (a Wiki-based approach to security issues for urban planners – see http://securipedia.eu/mediawiki/index.php/Welcome_to_Urban_Securipedia); BeSecure (an online platform that offers advanced search options and provides suggestions on what else might be interesting based on various criteria and users' choices – see http://bese.iti.com.pl/index.html#!/); Terra Toolkit project (with a range of publications and manuals for CVR practitioners – see http://terratoolkit.eu/); RAN best practice collection (available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/index_en.htm).
3.2.2. Findings and solutions

The evaluation toolkit builds on the state of the art in the area of CVE and addresses the major limitation (small number of evaluation studies) in three ways:

- By encouraging end-users to think about their intervention’s characteristics, and to find information about other relevant interventions via the toolkit, and by making end-users aware of how these interventions are interrelated with other factors that could be of interest;
- By helping to advance evaluation capacity so there is improved commitment and know-how to evaluate CVE interventions and so that, subsequently, there is a growing body of evidence to build on in the future;
- By taking stock of the (limited) evidence that is available to provide preliminary answers on the challenges that are currently restraining the effectiveness of CVE work.

As such, the evaluation toolkit is not a simple description of evaluation instruments. It is a knowledge-management tool to design and implement better interventions and evaluations. The toolkit will provide and, in the long term, help generate much-needed empirical evidence on what makes CVE interventions more or less effective and how to further improve them. The purpose of the evaluation toolkit is to inspire and guide practitioners, and inform end-users with regard to designing CVE interventions (so they are more conducive to evaluation), as well as planning and conducting evaluations.

There are a number of areas where the toolkit adds value over and above the current state of the art. First, it provides a single entry point to comprehensive and comparable information about radicalisation factors, CVE interventions, and evaluation thereof. For instance, it builds on the RAN’s collection of promising practices by coding the interventions it comprises and complementing these with interventions from other sources. Such a source of information has not been created before and it is made available through the evaluation toolkit.

Second, the evaluation toolkit provides theoretical, yet contextualised, interactive and tailored advice on how to plan and conduct an evaluation of a given CVE intervention. It relies on actual examples of evaluation instruments from CVE (and related fields) and where relevant, it provides recommendations on where current evaluation practice could be improved.

Third, the evaluation toolkit disseminates results of the meta-analysis of findings from existing CVE evaluations. This is the platform dedicated to policy and overview analyses.

Fourth, the evaluation toolkit helps end-users in their day-to-day work by enabling them to learn and improve their practice based on the evaluation evidence. In addition, the toolkit brings evaluation evidence to provide accountability to CVE funding.
3.3. Developing a manual and training course (WP4)

To support the toolkit prototype, a training course and a toolkit manual were developed. To achieve these objectives, the project team worked to:

- Ensure an accurate understanding of the toolkit framework and the theory and typologies that influenced its design, in order to be able to best use the evaluation toolkit;
- Equip end-users, via the train-the-trainer method, with the capability to effectively pass on the knowledge and skills acquired during the seminar in order to expand the breadth and applicability of the tool.

3.3.1. Challenges

Following consultations with consortium end-users, it became evident that the manual should answer a number of key questions external users are likely to have when first approaching this product, such as:

- Who is the toolkit for?
- What does the toolkit do? What can it help me do? What does the toolkit look like?
- Where is this applicable?
- When is this applicable?
- Why is it helpful?
- How does the toolkit do this? How do I use the toolkit?

With regard to the training course, the main challenge faced by course developers was twofold:

- Embedding a train-the-trainer component in the course and ensuring that training session participants could transfer knowledge acquired to colleagues and other practitioners in the field;
- Increasing end-users’ understanding of the toolkit’s professional relevance.

3.3.2. Findings and solutions

To meet end-users expectations around the manual, the manual document was structured around two main sections, which are discussed below:

- **Conceptual section:** This section draws on both the findings of work analysing the state of the art in CVE and the toolkit prototype development. The section opens with an introduction to evaluation methodology and practice, and key aspects of assessing programs that tackle violent radicalisation and extremism. Following that, the manual presents the purpose, benefits and added value of each component of the toolkit. The manual also provides vignettes presenting interventions and real-life situations in which the toolkit could be employed.
• **Operational section:** This section is designed to provide practical help for participants in using the online evaluation toolkit through a step-by-step guide.

The manual was made available to all users through the toolkit’s online platform. Users taking part in training sessions were also provided with access to the manual for reference and notes taken during the training day.

With regard to the training course, the research team first developed a one-day training course structured around the main sections and features of the toolkit. The training module allowed for ample practice time to ensure that participants could acquaint themselves with the toolkit prototype with the support of consortium trainers and end-users.

Following a first round of training sessions organised in partnership with consortium end-users, it became evident that participants required more engagement and a more practice-oriented approach to benefit from the training course. It was therefore decided to develop and pilot an expanded training course structured around multiple days of engagement to facilitate an understanding among end-users of how the toolkit could support them in their day-to-day work and increase uptake of our product.

On the basis of this feedback, the IMPACT Europe consortium developed a three-day capacity-building course. This course guides end-users in greater detail through the toolkit and the process of designing and implementing an evaluation plan. The training starts with a two-day course in which participants work on their evaluation plans with the help of the toolkit and under the supervision of IMPACT Europe trainers.

A prerequisite for the training is that participants are either planning to evaluate their intervention or are developing an intervention which they would like to evaluate. The third training day takes place six months after the first two training days. This provides the participants with the opportunity to discuss the on-going implementation of their evaluations with experienced evaluators and trainers, provide feedback and identify lessons learned about their work and the training. The third training day offers the opportunity to exchange challenges in conducting evaluations and focuses on how to overcome and deal with these challenges.

### 3.4. Piloting the toolkit (WP5)

As part of our project, a pilot programme was run to test the prototype of the evaluation toolkit developed. The main objective of this task was to assess the use of the evaluation toolkit and its benefits for end-users. In order to achieve this goal, the project team:

- Monitored whether the evaluation toolkit was understood and appropriately used by participating end-users;
- Assessed the toolkit’s user-friendliness, effectiveness (i.e. its ability to increase the capacity of end-users to design, carry out and learn from interventions), and utility;
- Assessed the toolkit’s feasibility, focusing on the capacity of the constituent tools to be tailored and rolled out at different intervention levels in various fields and countries.
In total, 187 individuals (124 end-user organisations) have been recruited to assess the toolkit.

3.4.1. Challenges

Overall, end-users saw great potential and added value in using the toolkit prototype to design and conduct evaluations in the field of CVE. They found the toolkit prototype intelligent and comprehensive. The majority of end-users found information in the toolkit prototype to be very complete, useful and relevant. In particular, the evaluation section was perceived as being helpful in designing and conducting evaluations in the field of CVE. The comprehensiveness of the toolkit, however, was also viewed as a challenge. End-users needed time to get acquainted with the toolkit prototype as they found its content complex. It should be noted that several users stressed that in a high-pressure and fast evolving field such as that of CVE, several external constraints limited their ability to engage for protracted periods of time with the toolkit prototype.

The toolkit prototype was found to be usable in different contexts and most suitable for end-users with an intermediate knowledge of evaluations. Data collected suggest that the usability of the toolkit prototype was dependent on the level of competency of the end-user. For end-users with no or a very basic knowledge of evaluation, using the toolkit proved more difficult than for end-users with an intermediate knowledge of evaluations. For end-users with background knowledge of evaluations, the toolkit prototype proved to be helpful as a source of information, rather than as a tool that builds their evaluation capacity.

The main difficulties that end-users encountered in using the toolkit prototype were the following:

- Plenty of information was available in the toolkit prototype, and as such it was not always easy for end-users to find out what the first step should be in designing an evaluation. Working with the toolkit prototype was easier for end-users that had prior experience with conducting evaluations than for non-experienced end-users. Non-experienced end-users would like to be guided more clearly on ‘how to’ design and conduct an evaluation and how the toolkit can help them in doing so.

- More could be done to make the content of the toolkit prototype more concise and practice-oriented. To increase the user-friendliness of the toolkit prototype, end-users suggested shortening and simplifying the text, and inserting a quick guide which gives an overview of the different navigation points within the toolkit prototype in order to help end-users find the information they are looking for more easily.

- The English language was found to be a barrier for some end-users, and therefore making the refined toolkit available in languages other than English was seen as an action that could potentially contribute to the usability of the toolkit in different countries.
3.4.2. Findings and solutions

The toolkit prototype was seen to have great potential for improving evaluations in the field of CVE. To further exploit this potential, it was recommended by end-users that the user-friendliness of the toolkit prototype be improved, especially for end-users with limited evaluation skills and those subject to time and resource constraints. To address the findings presented above, the following refinements to the toolkit prototype were made in WP6:

- Simplifying and shortening the language used in the toolkit;
- Improving the accessibility of the toolkit by improving the graphic user interface of the homepage by reducing the number of navigation points and giving it a more attractive and intuitive look;
- Inserting a quick guide which gives an overview of the different navigation points within the toolkit and helps end-users find the information they are looking for more easily;
- Translating this quick guide into German, Danish, Dutch and French.

Further details on the refinements made to the toolkit prototype, the training course and accompanying manual can be found in Deliverable D6.1 of this project.

3.5. Refining and stress-testing the toolkit (WP6)

This work package, as detailed by this deliverable, evaluated and synthesised the results from the pilot studies and the project as a whole, including with regard to its potential future adaptability. As part of this work package, our team explored how the toolkit fares under different conditions, and we refined it based on feedback from the end-users collated during the pilot programme and after.

This work package ensured that the project culminates in a single package communicating effective solutions in a comprehensive way for different types of end-users.

The final internal memo emerging from the project toolkit pilot, which sets out necessary adjustments, provided leading input for refining the toolkit, training course and pilot. End-users were asked to check and to give feedback on the refinement of the toolkit in order to establish whether these have really improved its user-friendliness and usability. The IMPACT Europe team integrated feedback into final conclusions and recommendations in order to further empower end-users to tailor the work to their specific context, programmes and needs.

The consortium agreed to create a quick guide to the toolkit that was translated into Danish, German, Dutch and French, facilitating use by first-line practitioners who are not necessarily fluent in English.
4. IMPACT Europe utility

Here we will examine who will find the toolkit developed by IMPACT Europe to be useful. There is clear political interest in CVE programmes using a top-down approach.

4.1. IMPACT Europe toolkit for policymakers

Policymakers, whether they be national or local, will be provided with methods of action selected especially for them, given their context and needs (youth, individuals returning from conflict areas, public-private partnerships, local or national programmes) in order to guide and determine present and future decisions regarding CVE programmes and their evaluation. Policy can be broad and visionary, set direction, and express standards, behaviours, and expectations – it is on this last point that the IMPACT Europe toolkit can be of particular value. The classical stages of the policy process, applied to CVE programmes and evaluations, provide insight into which activities could be supported by the IMPACT Europe toolkit:

- **Agenda setting/identification of problems or issues**: IMPACT Europe provides robust data on the radicalisation process.

- **Policy formulation**: IMPACT Europe can help conceptualise public policy through providing CVE examples. The tool also points to issues that need to be taken into account when setting the intervention goals, drawing on lessons from past CVE evaluations.

- **Policy adoption/legitimisation**: IMPACT Europe can contribute by supporting legitimacy – of public actions or statements by state officials, either elected or appointed – through providing scientific analysis of CVE programmes and evaluations.

- **Policy implementation**: IMPACT Europe can provide data on what works in terms of CVE design, operationally and communication, as well as for CVE evaluations, drawing from previous CVE evaluations.

- **Policy assessment/evaluation**: Even though its focus is more micro and operational, in supporting project- and programme-level evaluations, IMPACT Europe can support macro-evaluations on a policy level. This could be through choosing CVE methods or evaluations, or even through generalising or promoting them through public communication. As such, guidelines for planning and conducting evaluations can also be used by policymakers for purposes from choosing appropriate evaluation approaches to disseminating evaluation findings and altering policy course according to evaluation evidence.

4.2. IMPACT Europe for researchers
Researchers can find that in IMPACT Europe and its toolkit there are collected data and references, arranged and analysed on radicalisation, CVE programmes and evaluations. IMPACT Europe can be a supplement – hopefully a decisive and useful one – in building a robust understanding of these subjects, to which other researchers could in turn provide their contributions.

4.3. IMPACT Europe for practitioners

Communities of end-users and first-line practitioners are distinguished by operating level: commissioners of CVE programmes and evaluations, evaluators themselves, and evaluation implementers. Currently, the main challenge facing these groups is that those who are experts on CVE matters are not necessarily experienced in planning and conducting evaluations. On the other hand, evaluators might not be aware of specific aspects of CVE work. The toolkit is primarily focused on the first group, helping them to:

1) Decide what they want out of an evaluation study and what choices they may have to make when they commission an evaluation by external evaluators;

2) Conduct an evaluation study if they decide to do it internally.

4.3.1. IMPACT Europe for commissioners

On a ‘strategic’ level, CVE programme and evaluation commissioners have specific challenges, powers, and capacities that are evidently different from those of evaluators of implementers. It is assumed here that commissioners are interested in capacity building for CVE programme design, management and evaluation. From this perspective, such capacity building must necessarily do the following:

- Spearhead growth of evaluation culture in a domain where evaluation is often nascent, for example in order to gain a better idea of costs and benefits, or in order to communicate better for promoting a political agenda;

- Encourage collection of robust, comparable data in order to monitor and evaluate CVE work; in other words, get an evidence-based understanding of ‘what works’ in this field;

- Gather comparable data to identify lessons learned at different national and/or local levels, carried out by various commissioned CVE practitioners.

Programme evaluation must contend with a range of policy preferences articulated by (interest) groups and institutions involved in CVE programmes and evaluations. Entities that commission and evaluate CVE programmes expect some policy guidance for the undertaking. The evaluation, from this point of view, helps with decision making and underlines the impossibility of separating CVE programmes or evaluations from organizational, budgetary or political context.

Criteria for effectiveness (and cost-effectiveness in particular) are important for policymakers. However, this requires a profound examination, as the implementation and evaluation of CVE policy from the cost-effectiveness point of view is particularly challenging.
One tragic aspect of terrorism is that it requires states to quickly finance prevention tools and gain the support of citizens for such initiatives; preventive tools have the added constraint of not contradicting public liberties as repressive or policing approaches to violent extremism sometimes do. Given this, evaluating CVE public policy is vital. IMPACT Europe and its toolkit could push policymakers to share this mature perception of CVE programmes. CVE public policy could therefore become a public policy field like others, where emerging operational practices, pilot innovative programmes and evaluation weakness are replaced by programmes that are partially normalised and evaluation protocols that are robust and conform to the evaluation culture of a given country. Here, IMPACT Europe could be useful for ‘maturing’ CVE public policy.

4.3.2. IMPACT Europe for evaluators

On an operational level, we believe that IMPACT could contribute to:

- CVE evaluation capacity building;
- Streamlining and consolidating evidence-based understanding and lessons learned concerning the design, execution and evaluation of CVE activities – IMPACT is dedicated to becoming an important reference for practitioners through its databases;
- Planning and designing methods and tools that will be used for evaluation of interventions or programmes – from this point of view, IMPACT Europe provides a large selection of possible evaluation methods, a number of references and of evaluations that could be useful.

4.3.3. IMPACT Europe for implementers

Whether they are first-line practitioners or not, evaluation implementers will find that IMPACT Europe has, from a micro- and field-level perspective, the following aspects:

- An understanding of the perspective and needs of CVE evaluators in regards to evaluation (necessity to avoid poor data collection and existence of biases despite a lack of time for operationality);
- A need for staff members to have an understanding of evaluations and be confident in applying basic evaluation approaches and methods to their work – not everyone needs to be an expert, but everyone does need to have basic support for and understanding of evaluations – something which IMPACT Europe could potentially influence.

The true sense of conducting an evaluation study is when its results are used by CVE practitioners to improve their practices, interventions and programmes. There is no point in producing an evaluation report which will be archived immediately. The utility of evaluation is in making a positive difference in CVE practice. This requires a close collaboration and building of trust between those who implement the programmes, commission an evaluation and evaluators themselves.
From this perspective, the use of IMPACT Europe will improve the knowledge and skills of individuals involved in daily CVE activities and produce rough materials needed for evaluations. The IMPACT Europe toolkit provides guidelines on how to disseminate evaluation findings and follow-up evaluation recommendation, but perhaps more can be done in future to allow such a dialogue and cross-pollination of practices between evaluation and CVE.
5. Toolkit adaptability

As previously mentioned, IMPACT Europe contributes to the consolidation of existing knowledge on radicalisation, CVE programmes and interventions, and most importantly, CVE evaluation. As this programme has been active for a limited number of years, the representation of collected knowledge, the data that was used, the years in which they were produced, and the characteristics of collected information naturally posit questions over the toolkit’s sustainability. Will the programme and its outputs be valuable over the short, medium, and long term? This question goes back to the evaluation of the adaptability of the toolkit. Through adaptability, we want to emphasise the quality of the toolkit as it can be effortlessly modified to conform with requested changes.

5.1. Producing knowledge

First, it is startling to note that during the last 15 years, collected information was a lot more quantitatively important and probably more qualitatively robust than ever before – previously, studies on radicalisation were rare or nonexistent and the word itself was essentially absent from libraries and knowledge repositories. The IMPACT Europe programme therefore took place when a large number of data and practices were emerging. The framework of this report presents the systematic analysis of the birth of studies on radicalisation, the appearance of CVE, and the application, or perhaps the invention, of tools and methods for specific evaluations. Specific information and practical know-how, undoubtedly including information about radicalisation, CVE programmes and evaluations, were developed like other knowledge and practices.

5.2. Dynamics of understanding: towards maturity?

From this point forward, the production of knowledge, CVE practices and evaluations will continue to develop. As with all knowledge, it is not certain that radicalisation and its prevention will continue to produce work at the same rate, because a perfect and complete scientific knowledge is just a theoretical and asymptotical optimum. When the moment comes where collected information and practices provide satisfying, practical and robust responses which work, and when accomplished progress is more than marginal, the epistemic field is mature. We define maturity here as a ‘measurement’ of the ability of a community to continuously improve within a particular discipline. The higher the level of maturity, the higher the chances will be that incidents or errors will lead to improvements in either the quality or use of the resources implemented by the community.

Hence, the question is: are the scientific understandings and operational practices produced over the past few years, and collected by IMPACT Europe, generally sufficient for understanding radicalisation, developing CVE programmes, and evaluating those programmes? The answer is ‘yes’, as IMPACT analysed multiple sources according to a rigorous research protocol. It will be noted that the lead author of this report himself has designed, managed, co-conducted and evaluated a CVE programme in a prison context on
the subject of recidivism in jihad, by using knowledge and lessons learned in Europe through a lens of different EU-funded programmes he was involved in, including this one. However, it is too early to claim that the past few years, especially in Europe, the years during which knowledge on radicalisation, CVE practices, and evaluations were the most important, retained a normal, elevated rhythm of production. The ideal hypothesis is that the IMPACT Europe programme has existed since the climax of knowledge production on radicalisation. In a certain way, the fact that the EU financed the IMPACT Europe programme, which supported the evaluation of CVE programmes, is itself indicative of the EU's engagement, as it supported research on radicalisation after 9/11 (for example through SAFIRE). The EU logically tasked itself with disseminating any robust and serious evaluation practices within Europe. Even if understanding of radicalisation continues to be produced and CVE programmes continue to be created, for the past few years we have had numerous, practical, and usable understandings.

5.3. Sustainability of the toolkit

It is not certain that radicalisation, for example jihadism, will still be a problem in 10 years' time. By that time, the conditions may have been fulfilled to prevent individuals susceptible to radicalisation from becoming radicalised, due – for instance, but not only – to considerable societal or international changes.

Similarly, as CVE programmes and interventions are public policy issues, it is possible that the political, democratic, and societal volition of supporting these programmes and facilitating innovation within this domain will not exist in 10 years.

5.3.1. Toolkit adaptability: an assessment

Our team tried to analyse in detail the adaptability of the toolkit by placing it in different foresight scenarios. A key task in the latter stages of the IMPACT Europe project was to consider how the toolkit would perform under changing future environments. These could include changing threats, legal frameworks, public opinion, evaluation practice (e.g. innovative data collection methods), and continuing digitalisation of society (e.g. increasing online activity by protagonists in radicalisation). The task’s aim was to develop 'a set of recommendations for further developing and implementing the innovative evaluation toolkit.' For an overview of the methodology used for this task and for a detailed discussion of its findings, please see Annex 1.

A key initial task was to identify an Outcome of Interest to guide what we deemed to be a relevant factor. An Outcome of Interest represents the key features of the future environment that will be of relevance to the task’s aim.

The Outcome of Interest is affected by various factors, as the future environment in which the toolkit will operate will naturally be a complex environment with a wide range of relevant factors (two examples being the type of CVE actor involved and the resources available to them). These factors will have different trajectories (for example, for the ‘type of violent extremism factor’ identified below, trajectories could include greater incidence of right-wing extremism, and greater incidence of single-issue extremism).
We identified six categories of factors of relevance to the Outcome of Interest:

1) Type of violent extremism;
2) Type of CVE actor;
3) Resources available to violent extremists (including both financial and personal);
4) Resources available to CVE actors;
5) CVE approaches;
6) Violent extremist practices.

The trends pertaining to violent extremist practices show that violent extremists are expected to become increasingly innovative, not only in their use of technology but also in terms of using new networks and relationships. Possible future scenarios might include an increase in ‘lone-actor’ attacks by radicalised individuals as IS seeks to strike back following increasing military pressure on its locations in Iraq and Syria. At the same time, a rise in nationalism and electoral strength in Europe may lead to an increase in attacks by the extreme right, with related responses by the extreme left. In terms of trends pertaining to the wider environment, while these have been forecasted for the future, we suggest they can already be seen in the current environment and arguably represent a less significant upcoming change. We acknowledge, however, that any futures work has an inherent limitation in that it is speculative and so it is likely that developments will happen that have not been predicted here.

We found that the toolkit accommodates the various factor options well, although we identified areas where future review would be advisable. That is not to say this should or can be done at this point, as we are still uncertain on how the future environment will develop.

We identified various ways in which the toolkit accommodates the different factor options, either with general relevance and consideration, or with specific sections (e.g. the Interventions Database/Evaluation Guide/Lessons Learned sections). We found a slight contrast between the ways in which the different sections accommodate the possible future environment. On the one hand, the Evaluation Guide section was drafted in a flexible manner, anticipating a wide range of possible users (from government level to NGOs, from internal to external evaluators, and from those with no evaluation budget to a high evaluation budget). As such, many of the different factor options are topic-specific, meaning end-users can use the guidance in the Evaluation Guide’s Design and Conduct sections for their purposes in a variety of future environments. On the other hand, the Interventions Database and Lessons Learned sections are a little more restricted, in that they are more beholden to the database content that was originally collected in 2013–2014 (albeit that data also feeds into the Evaluation Guide section as examples).

It therefore seems advisable to consider all three sections, but perhaps prioritise Interventions Database and Lessons Learned, when reviewing developments that have happened in the interim and will continue to happen in 5–10 years. For instance, the issue for European governments of how to deal with returning ‘foreign fighters’ has become increasingly important and is an area we suggest may be looked at for more specific coding
in future iterations of the toolkit (see the Factors Matrix’s ‘Government/Intergovernmental organisations’ factor option under the ‘Type of CVE actor’ category).

5.3.2. Recommendations

Based on the findings outlined above on how the toolkit accommodates the different factors of relevance, we developed a series of recommendations for any future review or iteration of the toolkit. Specifically, for every factor option which we identified as requiring future review, we provided initial recommendations for such future consideration.

A number of the recommendations are relevant across factor categories, while some are unique to particular factor options. The Factors Matrix in Annex 1 describes the recommendations in full. In this section, we summarise the recommendations in the Factors Matrix as follows:

1) Developing a greater level of granularity of coding variable categories and options in future iterations of the IMPACT Europe database. This includes:
   a. Considering making coded variables more specific;
   b. Splitting categories where appropriate;
   c. Creating new coded variable categories (e.g. country of intervention – which is already in the database but not in the condensed search categories);
   d. Adapting previous coding as new coded variables (e.g. adapting current variables of ‘mechanism’, ‘activities’ and ‘goals’ to a new ‘CVE approach’ variable);
   e. General updating of the list of coded variables.

   This would be based on an updated review of sources that was originally done in the beginning of the IMPACT Europe project. The resulting updated data would feed into different parts of the toolkit, from representing fresh sources in Lessons Learned to being used for updating search variables in Interventions Database, and new examples provided in the Evaluation Guide.

2) Adding new sections to the Evaluation Guide’s Design section to cover:
   a. Drafting guidance specific to NGOs;
   b. New CVE activity types (e.g. ‘capacity building’);
   c. Expanding current sections (e.g. the Evaluation Guide’s text under ‘Disengage radicalised individuals from a violent extremist group’ could be expanded to cover guidance on evaluating interventions that seek to disengage individuals from ‘an ideology’ – see Design/CVE intervention/CVE intervention goals).

3) Considering new evaluation methods for the ‘Methods’ section, specifically ‘Social media analysis’. It is likely that the field of evaluation will develop over the coming 5–
10 years, and so we anticipate needing to review this area and consider new approaches and any developments on methods and guidance offered in the toolkit.

4) Updating and increasing the variety of examples (e.g. taking account of the rise of new types of violent extremism).

5) Adding new components to guidance under the Evaluation Guide. For instance, material to help users to select training programmes, and providing links to expertise on different types of CVE approach (e.g. counter-narratives).

6) Engaging new stakeholders to upload/require uploading. This entails addressing concerns about confidentiality, and so it may be advisable to allow stakeholders to upload only limited information where there are security or human rights concerns.

When – as we hope it will – the time arrives for reviewing the toolkit with a view to updating it for on-going utility, we are hopeful that these recommendations will provide a good starting point for a review plan. In addition to the summary areas for recommendations above, we would suggest prioritising areas to look at based on the delineations for levels of likelihood and impact provided in the Factors Matrix. For instance, we would expect that the factor options that have been considered both highly likely and highly impactful would be given highest priority.

5.3.3. Breakthrough innovations

As previously mentioned, one of the IMPACT Europe programme’s main goals was to raise the bar for CVE practices and evaluations. To a certain extent, one of the challenges taken into consideration was innovative practices. Due to their experimental nature, these are sometimes so recent that they are not yet known by the community of European practitioners, let alone recorded in scientific literature. In the same way, their utilisation in a classified programme could make their dissemination impossible. Their evaluation could also be difficult, or even impossible, given their novelty. If we use the protocol elaborated by our programme, a programme evaluation is a non-improvised process that is transparent, peer-reviewed and robust. Ideally, an innovative practice would merit being reproduced by other first-line practitioners in other programmes or interventions first, before being incorporated in our database and the IMPACT Europe toolkit.

Furthermore, while certain members of our team were themselves involved in CVE programmes or interventions and well informed about practitioners work and latest developments on the field, the choice of one method over another is not always rationally determined by end-users (i.e. considering the characteristics or needs of beneficiaries, local operational limits, or the client’s organisational context such as schools, jails, companies or local communities). Occasionally, an organisation will reach out for help and emphasise the price as the ultimate evaluation criteria. As such, the operational know-how of selected first-line practitioners is secondary.
5.4. Unused theoretical corpora and epistemic practices

Concentrating on operational CVE practices, IMPACT Europe’s focus was also on what were referred to as emerging practices, existing and evaluated radicalisation variables, CVE programmes and evaluation – the idea being to build robustness on solid and widely accepted activities. The CVE community requires standards, or at least verified and evidence-based lessons learned and solid evaluation tools.

Given the above, the theoretical corpora, which are rather under-used, underestimated or even ‘forgotten’ by research analysis due to researcher bias and preferred epistemic practices, constitute a grey area that could be incorporated into the fields of CVE and CVE evaluation. These theoretical fields materialise in specific domains that are not CVE programmes in a strict sense. However, their potential beneficiaries can have similar traits, profiles and needs to ‘normal’ CVE beneficiaries. Their evaluation can also have similar aspects, challenges, and tools to those selected by the IMPACT toolkit.

However, the consideration of these unexplored theoretical fields poses the following scientific and operational questions:

a. How does one judge the applicability of methods or tools derived from a theoretical field which are applied to specific programmes? For example, therapeutic fencing that is sometimes used to prevent paedophilia recidivism (by helping beneficiaries distance themselves from sexual phallic impulses), was recently used by a Member State in a CVE programme. One of the reasons for this was that the organisation that had called for the CVE programme was an organisation that specialised in preventing paedophilia. It is clear that this organisation did not acquire extraordinary results (yet surely merits independent, external evaluation).

b. How does one evaluate whether or not theoretical fields or operational practices originating in other fields can be used in CVE? Again, it will be claimed here that the choice of one method over another is not always founded on a rational, consequentialist choice, but rather on the fact that an organisation proposed a project and budget that was more interesting for the potential client.

Having said that, the consideration of alternative approaches could evidently be of interest with respect to principles and practices for CVE programmes and their evaluation.

The approach to identifying and judging evaluations in WP2 was mostly a psychological one. This means that the main perspective in the work underlying the WP2 database viewed (violent) radicalisation as behaviour shown by individuals (including maintaining relations with others, actions, utterings, appearances and attitudes). Consequently, counter-radicalisation interventions are viewed as the process of changing behaviour and evaluations of interventions were assessed from this psychological methodological perspective. This involved a focus on measuring changes in observable and measurable behaviours.

During the course of the IMPACT Europe project, several alternative approaches to assessing and evaluating the effectiveness of counter-radicalisation interventions have been
suggested. These approaches do not directly address behaviour of violent extremists, but focus on the method that was used. Based on our investigation (see Annexes 2 and 3), we conclude that alternative approaches such as restorative justice might be interesting for future use, but are still rare in the CVE field. As the underlying principles are similar to psychological theories such as the contact hypothesis, the structure of the toolkit is suitable for including future studies on the application of restorative justice in the domain of CVE interventions. It must be said that these alternative approaches, although some are still emergent, did not show up in the analysis of the state of the art two years ago. Consequently, we were not able to code them.

5.4.1. Alternative approach to countering violent extremism: restorative justice

Besides the CVE interventions already described in this report, there are no doubt many other viable options. One example is restorative justice, which is a method, policy or belief that communication and dialogue between harm-doers and harm victims has restorative value for all involved – especially victims. Justice is, in this sense, not only viewed as being executed by the government or a state. It is relevant for society and (suffering) individuals. It is often contrasted with more punitive methods in dealing with wrongdoing.

Restorative justice resembles theories about resolving conflict between individuals or groups through contact or dialogue. For example, a relatively early psychology theory called the intergroup contact theory, or the contact hypothesis, maintains that groups experiencing conflict can benefit from interpersonal contact by reducing prejudice and increasing understanding and appreciation between individuals belonging to different groups.

Our team included several interventions in the database supporting the toolkit that build on the contact hypothesis (i.e. engaging in dialogue) and therefore share similar starting points to restorative justice. Thus, although restorative justice as such is not included in the database, the theoretical underpinning and similar interventions are included. For the IMPACT Europe programme, restorative justice is important mainly as a potential intervention strategy, aimed at victims and perpetrators who have already engaged in crimes related to violent extremism, i.e. terrorism.

Because the focus of restorative justice is on resolving conflict after a crime has been committed, research on restorative justice and CVE is expected to be scarce. Indeed, a search in SCOPUS yielded zero results when searching for restorative justice and violent extremism. A search with restorative justice and radicalisation produced one result written in a non-English (Slavic) language. Another search in SCOPUS focusing on restorative justice in combination with terrorism yielded nine results. Of these articles, only one described an intervention targeted at diminishing violent extremism. The remaining four were focused on the role of restorative justice in forgiving terrorists, and four others were not focused on interventions at all.

\[^{12}\] radical* alone yielded 7260 results, and violent extremism alone yielded 343 results.
Whereas restorative justice is focused on reducing negative effects of crimes, especially for people who were the victim of a crime, it could also be a viable option for members of groups that have a history of conflict. However, it can also be used for groups that have a long tradition as rivals. Examples are the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, or the conflict between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda.\(^{13}\) In a case study on Arab and Jewish offenders and victims, Umbreit and Ritter (2006) found that dialogue resulted in improved relations between families of offenders and families of victims. It must be noted, however, that incorporating victims in CVE programs can sometimes be extremely challenging (due to victims’ stress, beneficiaries’ aggressivity). Recent viable approaches related to restorative justice include transformative education to develop community resilience, transitional justice, and the use of former combatants.

We have also considered two other theoretical fields: internet addiction and exit counselling. The former is important as online radicalisation appears to have been an extremely challenging issue over the past few years. Exit counselling tools and practices could be used to create distance between the ideology and the group, or the radicalising network in which the beneficiaries were radicalised.

### 5.4.2. Alternative approach to countering violent extremism: internet addiction prevention

An analysis that we recently completed (See Annex 3) found that the theoretical field and its practices are progressively adapted to be used by CVE programmes and interventions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of intervention</th>
<th>Internet addiction prevention programmes</th>
<th>Prevention of violent radicalisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vulnerable groups</strong></td>
<td>School and community programmes targeting groups (e.g. peer-to-peer initiatives)</td>
<td>Yes – jail settings: programmes targeting prisoners Yes – groups of young people at risk of radicalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individuals</strong></td>
<td>Multilevel counselling programme (Shek, Tang and Lo, 2009)</td>
<td>Yes – counselling to dissuade people from joining ISIS (Aarhus model in Denmark)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Society</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes – community-based approaches (Spalek 2012) Yes – Aarhus model in Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organisational contexts</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{13}\) For a description, see Rea (2012).
The prevention of internet addiction offers some treatment strategies which are already known from the cognitive-behavioural approach: practice opposite time of internet use (discover patient’s patterns of internet use and disrupt these patterns by suggesting new schedules), use external stoppers (real events or activities prompting the patient to log off), set goals (with regard to the amount of time online), abstain from a particular application (that the client is unable to control), use reminder cards (cues that remind the patient of the costs of internet addiction disorder (IAD) and benefits of breaking it), develop a personal inventory (shows all the activities that the beneficiary no longer engages in or cannot find the time for due to IAD), enter a support group (compensates for a lack of social support), and engage in family therapy (addresses relational problems in the family). It must be noted that some of these tools are potentially or already actionable in a CVE context. They could possibly be used against radical internet addiction. However in our view this has yet to be validated through a scientific approach.

5.4.3. Alternative approach to countering violent extremism: exit counselling

Exit counselling is a theoretical and practical corpus which seems to have a practical relevance to CVE with a concentration on the individual, and is used by many programmes and interventions. Furthermore, as it is a process founded on a formal agreement with beneficiaries convinced to leave a cult, it should be clearly distinguished from deprogramming. The latter is considered a process that does not request the beneficiary’s permission, but rather implies the use of coercion and/or confinement, which is contrary to the general ethics of European CVE programmes and interventions.

These techniques could also be instrumentalised in a militant, coercive, and unethical manner:

- Anti-cult movements may eventually decide to force individuals to leave their cult, including those in mainstream religions like Islam or Christianity.
- The border between illegal sect and religion is quite delicate, as emerging, non-violent religions could easily be defined as sectarian.

The notion of sectarian aberration is an operatory concept allowing the determination of a very specific type of behaviour, as may be the case with violent extremism. Here, there is a clear connection between ‘sectarian behaviour’ and ‘violent extremism’. France adopted this kind of approach before it was suspended a few months ago, undoubtedly because it featured sophisticated anti-cult legislation, having been regularly criticised by European courts. The chosen criteria for defining sectarian behaviour or membership are the following:

- Mental destabilisation
- Excessive financial demands
- Breaking with family environment

14 Cash et al. (2012).
• Infringements upon physical integrity
• Indoctrination of children
• Anti-social discourse
• Becoming a public nuisance\textsuperscript{15}
• Importance of judiciary difficulties
• Infiltration of legal business networks
• Attempts to infiltrate public power.

Although this requires a systematic examination, some of these elements would potentially merit an application of CVE, while others are too general or too vague. For example, the notion of mental destabilisation, for first-line CVE practitioners, may appear to be an interesting concept for helping a beneficiary distance themself from their peers or violence.

5.4.4. CVE and ethical questions

IMPACT Europe, in line with EU standards, has also considered any ethical issues involved with CVE while collecting data from CVE programmes, evaluations and the toolkit itself. Some occur at the macro or societal level and some at the more micro or programme level, or even at the programme evaluation level. In this section, both the macro- and micro-level ethical issues are addressed.

5.4.4.1. Macro level: ethical issues related to CVE programs in general

When individuals have engaged in extremist violence, there are legal grounds to require an individual to participate in a CVE program. Prevention of violent extremism is more difficult to justify – although understandable from a societal point of view, it is sometimes challenging to justify an intervention on legal grounds at the prevention stage.

Legal issue

There are limited legal grounds to intervene when a person has radical opinions but has not used violence and is not planning to use violence. From an ethical point of view, there might be justification to set up programmes for individuals who have radical ideas, but the justification cannot be based solely on security concerns or consequences of a possible terrorist attack. Radical ideas do not in themselves pose a direct threat to a democratic society, and our constitutions and human rights conventions explicitly allow citizens to develop their opinions undisturbed by government intervention.

Group stigmatisation

Adolescents and groups that are selected for preventive interventions may feel stigmatised by being addressed by a preventive CVE intervention. Being labelled as ‘radicalised’ is itself detrimental terminology. Some European programmes have faced the critique that many

\textsuperscript{15} MIVILUDES (undated).
Muslim communities are synonymous with suspect communities. This categorisation of entire communities is not relevant to CVE programmes and interventions, as CVE generally focuses on smaller groups or individuals. In the worst case scenario, this type of categorisation could lead to massive distrust of social institutions.

**Distrust between groups in society and law enforcement**

If social programs in communities are linked to CVE initiatives, distrust may rise because people might feel that social workers, youth workers and local government are going to report them to the police. In such situations, first-line practitioners can themselves be wrongly seen as informants for the authorities or police. People might also be reluctant to contact the local authorities if they fear that their children are at risk of being branded as criminals or violent extremists.

**Ethnic profiling for inclusion in CVE programs**

In policies to prevent violent extremism, how are choices made regarding which groups to include in interventions? In the EU, intelligence services consider the risks of terrorist attacks perpetrated by jihadist (or jihadist-inspired individuals/groups) to be the biggest threat. Other groups, for example right-wing or left-wing extremists, might also pose a risk of terrorist attacks but this is estimated to be lower. The narrative may therefore be that in order to prevent major terrorist attacks, one should focus on Muslim extremists or Muslims who might become extremists. This could lead to ethnic profiling in which only Muslims are included in CVE programs. One operational solution to this may be to focus on risk factors like personal traits or behavioural issues rather than religious opinions, especially at the start of programmes and interventions.

5.4.4.2. Micro-level ethical issues related to the evaluation of CVE programs

**Ethical issues related to evaluation of social policy**

There are ethical issues associated with evaluation of social policy in general. These result from the contrasting interests and wide disparities of power among stakeholders: intervention beneficiaries (actual and potential); intervention funders, coordinators, and implementers; and evaluators.

In evaluation there are always interests at stake: those of the people and organisations performing the program under evaluation, interests of the people and organisations funding the programme, interests of the people in the programmes, and interests of the people and organisations that perform the evaluation. For all these people and organisations there is something at stake in evaluation. This means that choices of evaluation method may be contested.

In designing an evaluation, one of the questions is who is going to evaluate. There is no perfect solution here: an internal evaluator knows a program ‘from the inside’ as a first-line practitioner themself, and knows its staffers. This might be beneficial for gaining access but it might also bias the evaluator. Hiring an external evaluator might seem more objective but the mere fact that an evaluator is paid by the organisation whose program is evaluated will also bias the external evaluator.
Another important question is what type of evaluation is chosen. In the list of methods, different methodological and ethical issues are raised. In choosing a method, a choice is made on which types of evidence are gathered and which are not. Questions about what constitutes valid proof of whether an intervention is effective are highly contested and answers to these questions depend in part on the scientific field that informs one’s perspective. Although these questions are of a methodological nature, they have an ethical dimension because they are related to the type of data that is gathered and who can or cannot provide the necessary data.

**Ethical issues during the evaluation of CVE programmes**

This aspect is quite significant, in view of security and confidentiality aspects that could occasionally be seen as contradictory. It is notable that many ethical problems discovered during the CVE evaluation process also exist during the implementation of CVE programmes. Essentially, the context in which a programme operates (e.g. local law) could increase the ethical requirements of first-line practitioners. Consequently, even if developing trust is a necessary condition for success in a CVE programme, the whole evaluation process, including involving beneficiaries (through a satisfaction or quality survey) and/or evaluating beneficiaries themselves (degree of detachment from radical ideology, best management of psychological dysfunction, best capacity for social reintegration, etc.), creates important ethical issues:

**Informed consent:** For ethical reasons, a CVE evaluation, regardless of chosen methods, should be based on preliminary and formalised agreements made with interviewees and focus groups. However, security clearance can also be a pertinent issue, as interviewees sometimes do not have the authorisation needed to view evaluation results but are usually allowed to review interview transcripts.

Asking for consent is also necessary if the evaluation, or even the CVE programme itself, includes minors as either beneficiaries or respondents. However, according to different laws in Member States, and the judicial situation of minors, it is possible that the law in question does not require formal legal authorisation from minors, but rather their agreement in principle, and in addition the informed consent of their parents or legal guardians.

**Confidentiality of data:** In theory, data that respondents have given should be confidential and stored securely. In fact, evaluation data, as well as data collected in CVE programmes, could in certain cases be difficult to keep confidential. Consider the example of collecting data in jail, or from minors on probation, in a legal manner: penitentiary authorities or judges could, according to existing law in member states, formally request that this data be transmitted to them.

**Security of professionals:** Finally – and this is an aspect that concerns CVE programmes and evaluations – the question of professionals’ security (first-line practitioners and evaluators) is a significant one. Professionals engaged in the conduct or evaluation of CVE programmes might experience many different kinds of risks. These risks can be physical or verbal, and also emotional or professional. Working with beneficiaries that are returning to an area under the influence of jihad or with those that have committed terrorist acts is sometimes
emotionally stressful, risky and perhaps even dangerous. Data collected by IMPACT Europe, as well as feedback from certain members of our team, imply that, given these risks, it is important that:

1. First-line practitioners are capable of handling verbal or physical aggressiveness by beneficiaries with help from robust techniques – for example assertiveness;

2. The environment in which the CVE programme or evaluation is carried out is secure;

When appropriate, an internal mechanism within the team of first-line practitioners allows the detection and management of stress and professional burn-out.
6. Conclusion

IMPACT Europe, due in no small part to its toolkit, could and should be an essential contribution to advancing the comprehension of radicalisation, CVE programmes and, vitally, the evaluation of those programmes.

Policymakers, whether national or local, will find methods of action tailored to their specific context and needs, in order to guide present and future decisions regarding CVE programmes and their evaluation. For researchers, IMPACT Europe can supplement efforts to achieve a robust understanding of these subjects. Most of all, the toolkit can help diverse communities of practitioners to decide what they want out of an evaluation study and what choices they may have to make when they commission an evaluation by external evaluators. It will also help them to conduct an evaluation if they decide to do it internally.

IMPACT Europe’s principal result is a more robust mode of measuring effectiveness, broadly defining and evaluating programmes and interventions. The toolkit can help a range of end-users, from policymakers to first-line practitioners, in ways that reflect their respective needs. This leads to the specification of evaluation programmes according to core evaluation principles, basics and procedures. It can also help evaluations to attain the minimum level of required data in a structured and robust way.

IMPACT Europe and its toolkit also make it possible to select and implement more appropriate responsive measures with the goal of eventually contributing to the design of better, more focused policy. Through IMPACT, stakeholders can find useful information on identifying good or promising practices in tackling violent extremism. It can also play a significant role in enabling the management of knowledge that is necessary for informing on the basis of evidence.

CVE programmes, interventions and evaluations should be fully cognisant of human rights and ethical considerations, as established in a number of charters, such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In our view, IMPACT Europe has respected ethical and human rights guidelines, while presenting concrete solutions and successful experiences of CVE management and evaluation, specifically with regard to data protection or avoiding group stigmatisation. It should be noted, however, that the IMPACT consortium has not evaluated CVE interventions and evaluations included in the toolkit on their adherence to the human rights standards established in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

In addition, it is important to mention that our toolkit will be as widely accessible as possible. Our goal here is not only to improve professional practices on efficient and ethical bases, but also to heighten awareness of the complexity of measuring and evaluating interventions countering violent extremism. IMPACT Europe has contributed by assembling a community of experts and practitioners, which in turn solidified the CVE practitioner community itself.

However, many things still remain to be done in CVE. First of all, no one knows what violent extremism in Europe will look like in five to ten years. Additionally, IMPACT Europe’s outputs
represent only the first iteration of such products and further changes should be implemented or occur in the future, including:

- With acquired experience, certain CVE practices will progressively impose themselves or become legitimate advantages, while others will disappear forever. This is due to the fact that few programmes have, at this point, been evaluated in a serious manner.
- While it is possible that the understanding of violent extremism is currently robust, some factual or analytical progress will undoubtedly need to be made. On this point, IMPACT Europe is representative, in terms of ambition and seriousness, of current knowledge and understanding.

Many things need to be done. For the toolkit itself, we recommend exploring the following possibilities:

- Developing a greater level of granularity of coding variable categories and options in future iterations of the IMPACT Europe database;
- Adding new sections to the Evaluation Guide’s ‘Design’ section to cover drafting guidance specific to NGOs and new CVE activity types (e.g. ‘capacity building’);
- Considering new evaluation methods for the ‘Methods’ section, specifically ‘social media analysis’;
- Updating and increasing the variety of examples;
- Adding new components to guidance under the Evaluation Guide – for instance, material to help users to select training programmes, and providing links to expertise on different types of CVE approach (e.g. counter-narratives);
- Engaging new stakeholders to upload/requiring uploading data to the database.

For what we may call the ‘CVE state of the art’, we recommend the following directions for development:

- Unused theoretical fields and operational practices must be applied to CVE programmes and their evaluation. We have seen this in some regards recently – restorative justice, exit counselling, internet addiction (this last point being quite new in regards to CVE) – and we hope our successors will continue on this path.
- Similarly, we hope to see intensive efforts to improve the evaluation of the beneficiaries of CVE programmes – this remains a sensitive aspect of CVE and evaluation in general, and evaluating the potential for recidivism is critical for our open societies.

Another forward step will be to expand the translation of radicalisation findings, CVE good practices and evaluations, notably into non-English languages. Non-English-speaking first-line practitioners have limited access to recommended practices due to linguistic barriers, even though these findings directly concern them.
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1. Annex 1 – Assessing how the toolkit would stand the test of time

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This annex has been reviewed in accordance with RAND Europe Quality Assurance procedures.

1.1. Introduction

A key task in the latter stages of the IMPACT Europe project was to consider how the toolkit would perform under changing future environments. These could include changing threats, legal frameworks, public opinions, changes in evaluation practice (e.g. innovative data collection methods), and continuing digitalisation of society (e.g. increasing use of online activity by protagonists). The task’s aim was to develop ‘a set of recommendations for further developing and implementing the innovative evaluation toolkit.’ (IMPACT Europe Description of Work)

We begin with an overview of the methodology used for the task, before setting out key findings about the future environment and how the toolkit would accommodate it. Finally, we outline a set of recommendations for any future review of the toolkit, emanating from the findings.

1.2. Methodology

1.2.1. Methodology: an approach based on the principles of scenario development

To meet the task’s objective, we adopted a four-stage approach, designed and agreed in an internal workshop. First, we mapped out the possible future environment. Second, we considered how the toolkit would cope with different future factors. Third, we developed initial suggestions for future review of the toolkit, stemming from the findings of the first two stages. Finally, we undertook a validation of the initial findings from the first three stages.

The initial suggestions developed in Stage 3 were subsequently analysed and summarised, with the resulting final list of overview recommendations being outlined in the final section of this annex. See Figure 1 for an illustration of the process.

Figure 1: Overview of methodology
1.2.2. Stage 1: Mapping out the possible future environment

1.2.2.1. Approach overview

To map out the possible future environment, we developed a methodology based on the principles of scenario planning. Scenario planning is a methodology that helps in anticipating future uncertainties. Initial literature on scenario planning was developed by RAND in the 1950s, as a tool to help decision makers understand how policy options at their disposal would fare under different future conditions.

It is important to iterate that scenarios depict the range of plausible futures relevant for the system under analysis. Hence, rather than predicting what will happen, scenarios aim to delineate what might happen with the purpose of anticipating potential uncertainties. The aim of this task has been to manage such uncertainties by exploring them and making some suggestions on how developments may be accommodated in the future.

With this in mind, rather than the typical scenario planning approach of using different factors to develop two or three scenarios, our aim was to consider a wide range of possible factors of relevance to the future of the toolkit. Doing so would allow us to test the toolkit as comprehensively as possible, as opposed to considering its applicability in just two or three example scenarios.

We therefore focused on developing a comprehensive list of ‘factors’, which we defined as an element that influences or contributes to a change in the future environment that those using the toolkit will be operating in. Adopting the factors-based approach helped us to test the performance of the toolkit against a range of plausible trends and developments. We also collated a list of trends (that may influence the different factors), in order to develop a sound understanding of the possible future environment's likely factors.

In terms of timeframe, we identified factors for the next five to ten years, as a longer outlook was considered unhelpful due to the uncertainty associated with it being so great that it would make for a purely academic exercise.

A key initial task was to identify an Outcome of Interest to guide what we deemed as a relevant factor. An Outcome of Interest represents the key features of the future environment that will be of relevance to the task’s aim. The Outcome of Interest is impacted on by trends and / or factors. We outline some key definitions of our conceptual framework in Table 1.

We selected the principal Outcome of Interest as the type/s of CVE intervention that will be present in the future. This was chosen as it represents the future strategic context that is most relevant to the toolkit.

The Outcome of Interest is affected by various factors, as the future environment in which the toolkit will operate will naturally be a complex environment with a wide range of relevant factors (two examples being the type of CVE actor involved and the resources available to them). These factors will have different trajectories (for example, for the type of violent

16 Deweerdt (1973); Kahn and Weiner (1967); Kahn et al. (1976); Smith (1964).
extremism factor, trajectories could include greater instance of right-wing extremism, and greater instance of single-issue extremism).

We acknowledge that this choice of Outcome of Interest has meant less of a focus on specific developments in the field of evaluation itself. It is likely that new methods and theoretical corpuses will materialise in the timeframe considered. As such, we anticipate needing to review this area and consider new approaches and any developments on methods and guidance offered in the toolkit. While these are relevant for the toolkit, they are not specifically covered as factors of the future environment that affect the Outcome of Interest (namely the ‘type of CVE intervention’). An alternative approach would have been to select an Outcome of Interest focusing on the evaluation field, but that was considered less critical to the toolkit than the CVE field. Instead, we consider possible future developments of the evaluation field in Stage 2.

Once we had collated a list of factors we delineated each one by level of likelihood and level of impact, to help with prioritising recommendations in due course. We defined these as follows:

- **Likelihood**: Whether this is likely to be a factor in the future (in 5–10 years).
- **Impact**: High level of casualties, property or financial cost / disruption (impact may be positive or negative). This could be long term or short term, local or international, and strategic or tactical.

### Table 1: Terminology used in the conceptual framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Illustrative example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trend</td>
<td>A discernible pattern of change</td>
<td>Increasing self-radicalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome of Interest</td>
<td>An aspect of the future strategic context that is a consequence of a particular trend or an interaction of multiple trends and / or factors</td>
<td>The type/s of CVE intervention that will be present in the future. One type of intervention, for instance, would be a school-based intervention addressing individuals deemed to be at risk of self-radicalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor</td>
<td>An element that influences or contributes to a change in the future system. It is influenced by trends. <em>Note: Factors that directly influence or cause change are sometimes referred to as ‘drivers’</em></td>
<td>Type of violent extremism: lone actor / lone wolf / self-radicalisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.2.2.2.Methodological overview

Our approach to identifying the list of possible future factors (as well as delineating their likelihood and impact) was threefold. First, we reviewed available literature; second, we consulted with experts in relevant fields; and third, we conducted a series of workshops. The workshops comprised both internal and external workshops, including:

- RAND Europe workshop to plan the approach;
- RAND Europe workshops to consider literature review findings and set up the framework for presenting the factors (a Factors Matrix, as described below);
- RAND Europe workshop to develop suggestions of refining the toolkit based on the Factors Matrix and a follow-up to prepare for the partner workshop;
- Partner workshop;
- Final RAND Europe refining workshop.

Literature review

Our literature review aimed to identify a list of factors that will drive the Outcome of Interest in the future. Related to factors are trends that influence them, and so we also identified a list of relevant trends. These included increased migration and developments in extremists’ access to weapons (e.g. CBRN-E).18

To identify relevant sources, we conducted searches in appropriate online bibliographic databases. Specifically, we designed and followed a protocol for searching on Google Scholar, EBSCO Host, and Google. This employed the key search terms ‘extremism’, ‘radicalisation’ and ‘terrorism’, in combination with the terms ‘trends’, ‘future’, ‘foresight’, and ‘scenarios’. We did not limit the search to the European context, as a) there were not enough results to allow for this, and b) the issues surrounding the field of counter violent extremism are largely international in nature. As such, casting a wider net when searching for relevant factors in the future is a good way of anticipating what may be relevant in Europe.

We identified 40 relevant sources, which we reviewed. The review was done by two researchers. The first five sources were reviewed by both researchers to ensure the assessments made on relevance were consistent. After that, the 35 outstanding sources were reviewed by one researcher each. Of the 40 sources, 21 were considered relevant for the review. Factors, trends, and likelihood/impact levels were extracted from each of these 21 sources and compiled in a list of initial findings.

First draft of Factors matrix

We then mapped out the list of initial findings from the literature review in a table we refer to as a ‘Factors Matrix’. This outlined factors relevant to the Outcome of Interest, including their categories and trajectories (as described above). We also developed a list of related trends. We then further added to the Factors Matrix based on the IMPACT Europe database and toolkit’s search categories previously developed as part of IMPACT Europe and presented in

18 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives defence
the Interventions Database section, RAND Europe expertise in the area of CVE and evaluation, and a key report outlining the state of the CVE field.¹⁹

At this point we added for each factor trajectory the delineations for likelihood and impact levels. This was based in part on the literature review, and where there were any gaps we discussed within the project team in the set of workshops described above, and came to an agreed assessment.

The appendix to this annex sets out the final Factors Matrix. This first step of its development resulted in a draft version of its first five columns.

Consultation with experts

To validate the Factors Matrix’s categories and trajectories, we consulted with experts. These were European experts in the fields of radicalisation, counter-terrorist policing, security and related fields. We contacted eight experts, four of whom have responded within the timeframe of the task. Of these, one was an academic expert, and the rest had expertise both as academics and practitioners. We conducted the consultation where possible in a face-to-face interview (x1) and the rest by email exchanges. The consultation comprised sharing the Factors Matrix and soliciting feedback and suggested development points. Based on feedback obtained, we further developed the Factors Matrix. Feedback obtained ranged from suggestions to add a factor category or trajectories, to changing the delineation level of likelihood or impact of particular factor trajectories.

1.2.3. Stage 2: Identifying how the toolkit would accommodate different future factors

In the second stage, we considered how the toolkit would perform vis-à-vis the different factors outlined in the Factors Matrix, to identify any potential gaps and to suggest ways to address these gaps. We focused on factors that were delineated as ‘high’ for either ‘likelihood’ or ‘impact’.

This stage was initially undertaken in an internal RAND Europe workshop, by adding the penultimate column to the Factors Matrix (see the next section for how this was validated by consortium partners). For each factor option, the team made a qualitative assessment on the extent to which the toolkit successfully accommodates each option, and outlined any potential gaps. In doing so, consideration was also given to possible developments in the field of evaluation. The team involved in this was carefully selected to ensure those with detailed knowledge of the toolkit were complemented with in-house experts in the fields of CVE, counter-terrorism, and evaluation methodologies.

¹⁹ Romaniuk (2015).
1.2.4. Stage 3: Developing initial suggestions

Where a potential gap was identified in Stage 2, suggestions for addressing the gap were provided. These were added as a final column to the Factors Matrix. These suggestions are separate from the final recommendations, which are outlined in the next section.

It is important to note that any such suggestions for ‘development in the future’ do not necessarily mean that there is any improvement that should be made at the current time. The aim was to consider how the toolkit would accommodate future changing environments, with a view to developing a set of suggestions and recommendations for how the custodians of the toolkit may deal with different future factors.

1.2.5. Stage 4: Final validation

Two final layers of iteration and validation were conducted. First, a partner workshop was held, in which both stages 1 and 2 were reviewed and refined. Where there were any gaps in appropriately accommodating the factors, the participants discussed and sought to agree how to best address those areas.

This was attended by six of the IMPACT Europe consortium partners, who contributed expertise on radicalisation, CVE implementation and toolkit development. This ensured that the task benefited from the expertise of those with familiarity of the toolkit’s contents and with toolkit users’ on-the-ground expertise.

The final layer of iteration was a post-partner workshop RAND Europe review. This was introduced as a layer of review with the aim of ensuring that any updates made in the partner’s workshop were in line with the overall conceptual framework. This resulted in a small number of finessing updates to the Factors Matrix.

1.3. Findings

Before considering the findings on the full range of factors, we outline the relevant underlying trends which we identified in Stage 1 of the methodology. These are of interest for developing our understanding of the future environment, as each trend has a degree of influence on the different factors outlined in the Factors Matrix. As such, the trends provide a helpful background context that can go some way to explaining the presence of the different factors in the Factors Matrix. In Table 2 we have grouped the trends we identified into those that are particularly relevant for affecting violent extremists’ approaches, and those that generally pertain to the environment in which protagonists operate.

The trends pertaining to violent extremists’ approaches show that violent extremists are anticipated to become increasingly innovative, not only in their use of technology but also in terms of using new networks and relationships. Possible futures might include an increase

20 Vidra and Fox (2012); Sedgwick (2010); Navarro and Villaverde (2014); van der Lijn (2011); Linde and van der Duin (2011); Yap and Park (2010); Bermingham et al. (2009).
in attacks by self-radicalised individuals\textsuperscript{21} as ISIS seeks to strike back following increasing military pressure on its locations in Iraq and Syria.

In terms of trends pertaining to the wider environment, while these have been forecast for the future, we suggest they can already be seen in the current environment and arguably represent less of a significant upcoming change. A key trend of note is an increase in nationalism and electoral strength in Europe, which could be associated with an increased risk of attacks by both the extreme right and extreme left.\textsuperscript{22}

Table 2: Overview of key identified trends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of trend</th>
<th>Specific trends</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trends pertaining to violent extremist' approaches</td>
<td>Changes in use of IT (communications, info development, social media) and other technological developments</td>
<td>Vidra and Fox (2002), Sedgwick (2010), Navarro and Villaverde (2014), van der Lijn (2011), van de Linde and van der Duin (2011), Yeap and Park (2010), Bermingham et al. (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continual violent extremist recruitment and on-going amassing of financial reserves / future proofing</td>
<td>Hoffman (2003), Bowman (2008)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{21} Genkin and Gutfraind (2011); Ibrahim (undated); Yeap and Park (2010); Singh (2012).

\textsuperscript{22} Vidra and Fox (2012); Sedgwick (2010); Navarro and Villaverde (2014); van der Lijn (2011). Also based on expert judgement under Methodology Stage 1.
### Trends relating to public and political developments (both at the state level and at the international level)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of trend</th>
<th>Specific trends</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater funding diversification</td>
<td></td>
<td>Expert judgement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in levels of nationalism / Extreme right wing</td>
<td>Vidra and Fox (2002), Sedgwick (2010), Navarro and Villaverde (2014), van der Lijn (2011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in levels of extreme left wing</td>
<td></td>
<td>Expert judgement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in levels of local and regional conflict</td>
<td>Vidra and Fox (2002), Sedgwick, Navarro and Villaverde (2014), van der Lijn (2011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing imposition of Western values / clash of cultures</td>
<td>Navarro and Villaverde (2014), van de Linde and van der Duin (2011), Nacos</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in levels of migration</td>
<td>Vidra and Fox (2002), Sedgwick (2010), Navarro and Villaverde (2014), van der Lijn (2011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in levels of climate change and resource scarcity</td>
<td>Bowman (2008), Bakker (2012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing numbers of failed / lawless states / ungoverned areas (including virtual / online ungoverned areas)</td>
<td>van de Linde and van der Duin (2011), expert judgement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in the politicisation and / or radicalisation of Islam</td>
<td>Malashenko and Yarlykapov (2009), van de Linde and van der Duin (2011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in media domination by ‘the West’</td>
<td>van de Linde and van der Duin (2011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Overview of factors

The Factors Matrix (in the appendix to this annex) represents the findings for this task in their full detail. In this section we provide an overview of the Factors Matrix’s contents, both
in terms of what we anticipate the future environment to look like, and in terms of how the toolkit would accommodate the different future factor trajectories (for recommendations see the next section).

We identified six categories of factors of relevance to the Outcome of Interest:

7) Type of violent extremism
8) Type of CVE actor
9) Resources available to violent extremists (including both financial and personal)
10) Resources available to CVE actors
11) CVE approaches
12) Violent extremist approaches

As described in the previous section, each factor has range of different plausible trajectories. In this section we provide summaries of how the toolkit would accommodate different factor trajectories in the future. In the first instance, we summarised the Factors Matrix in two tables: Table 3 sets out the 46 factor trajectories that were considered highly likely and/or highly impactful (out of a total number of factor trajectories of 52). Of these, 18 were marked as both highly likely and highly impactful.

Table 4 sets out the extent to which the toolkit would accommodate these factor trajectories, grouped by factor categories.

**Overview of initial suggestions**

For each factor trajectory identified in Stage 2 as one that may be reviewed in the future, we developed specific initial suggestions, as outlined in the last column of the Factors Matrix. We summarised this in a list of five overall findings, which are outlined in Table 5. For each finding, we have provided an overview of the likelihood and impact levels of associated factor trajectories (by adding up and providing percentages of the number of factor trajectories delineated as highly likely and/or highly impactful). In addition, we have delineated a level of priority in the final column, based on a qualitative assessment made by the IMPACT Europe team about the extent to which the toolkit appropriately addresses each factor trajectory. This was done in the workshops under stages 2, 3 and 4 of the methodology. The rationale for this was that even where a factor trajectory if highly likely and potentially highly impactful, if the toolkit already addresses this then we do not suggest attaching a high level of priority to addressing this in the future compared with another factor trajectory that is only addressed in part (see the Recommendations section for further prioritising of next steps).

**Table 3: Summary of factor trajectories identified as highly likely to happen or highly impactful**

23 For sources, see the Factors Matrix in the appendix to this annex and the References section.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor category</th>
<th>Factor option</th>
<th>Highly likely</th>
<th>Highly impactful</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of violent extremism</td>
<td>Religious (e.g. Islamist)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationalist / separatist</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extreme right wing</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extreme left wing</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of CVE actor</td>
<td>Government / Intergovernmental organisations (including OSCE and UN, but also police, probation services, social care and health care). To include both frontline and policymakers.</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NGO (both local and international NGOs, to include single issue organisations)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community / grass roots (including online communities, e.g. Anonymous)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education institutions</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious institutions</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private sector (including social media companies, online actors, and tech companies such as Google and Facebook)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources available to violent extremists (including both financial and personal)</td>
<td>Resources remain the same</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources available to CVE actors</td>
<td>Resources increase (including ‘game-changers’ / ‘wildcards’, i.e. unexpected significant increase)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVE approaches</td>
<td>Engagement and outreach / Strengthening community cohesion (including addressing polarisation)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education and mentoring</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor category</td>
<td>Factor option</td>
<td>Highly likely</td>
<td>Highly impactful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building (including skills and capabilities) and training (either domestic or international)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of technological / innovative developments (e.g. by Google)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and positive alternatives</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messaging: Using counter-narratives (e.g. using websites and social media, Strategic Communications) (specified in Factors Matrix as Messaging item 1 of 5)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messaging: Addressing identities and beliefs (specified in Factors Matrix as Messaging item 2 of 5)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messaging: Emphasising the religious framework (e.g. use of religious or theological leaders in prisons, and engaging with theological and jurisprudential corpuses) (specified in Factors Matrix as Messaging item 5 of 5)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Therapeutic / emphasising ideological and psychological</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International approach (1 of 2): Taking a diplomatic approach (i.e. foreign policy)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International approach (2 of 2): collaboration</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public-private collaboration</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focusing on the national level (bespoke, i.e. tailoring responses specifically to national context)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater use of intelligence</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novel / alternative models</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of hard power impacting on CVE (e.g. sanctioning, increasing use of the police and military – both in terms of greater visibility and specific operational aims)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent extremist approaches</td>
<td>Guerrilla warfare / insurgency / unconventional warfare / irregular warfare / long war</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence operations (aims of maximising media coverage)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-starting cells pledging allegiance</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber-terrorism / cyber attacks</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor category</td>
<td>Factor option</td>
<td>Highly likely</td>
<td>Highly impactful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Targeting energy / food supplies / water</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spectacular</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adaptive / varying attacks (including knife and truck attacks)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual / lone actor / lone wolf / self-radicalisation / inclusive (vs. exclusive)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marauding terrorism (i.e. small group of armed terrorists launching coordinated attacks, normally on general public, including where this is clearly building on combat experience or other experienced networks)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Large-scale weapons (e.g. CBRN-E) / technological terrorism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Suicide terrorism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sabotage</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Use of internet and communications / technology</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International collaboration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Single country focus</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Use of crime networks</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Summary of how the toolkit would accommodate factor trajectories delineated as highly likely to happen and/or impactful

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor category</th>
<th>Factor option delineated as either highly likely or highly impactful</th>
<th>Would the toolkit accommodate these factor trajectories? (based on methodology stages 2 and 4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of violent extremism</strong></td>
<td>• Nationalist / separatist • Extreme right wing • Extreme left wing</td>
<td>Yes, but requires reviewing in the future: • Design, Conduct and Lessons Learned: accommodate this, with relevant examples. • Interventions Database: IMPACT Europe database has a category of 'political',</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24 For sources, see the Factors Matrix in the appendix to this annex and the References section.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor category</th>
<th>Factor option delineated as either highly likely or highly impactful</th>
<th>Would the toolkit accommodate these factor trajectories? (based on methodology stages 2 and 4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Type of CVE actor | • Government / Intergovernmental organisations (including OSCE and UN, but also police, probation services, social care and health care). To include both frontline and policymakers.  
  • NGO (both local and international NGOs, To include single issue organisations)  
  • Community / grass roots (including online communities, e.g. Anonymous)  
  • Education institutions  
  • Religious institutions  
  • Private sector (including social media companies, online actors, and tech companies such as Google and Facebook) | Yes, but requires reviewing in the future:  
  • Material throughout toolkit is relevant for practitioners in these organisations. Examples throughout include ones from all of these organisations except for private sector organisations.  
  • Toolkit does not provide specific guidance for the different types of actor (e.g. guidance specific for NGOs).  
  • Interventions Database: IMPACT Europe database has search categories under ‘Group of focus’ that broadly cover the different types of actor, albeit not as exact matches. For instance, grouping together ‘Education sector and religious leaders’, and not having a specific type of actor matching ‘private companies’ (nearest search term is ‘Communities’). This has further significance as the content of this section feeds into other sections (e.g. Beneficiaries section in Design). |
| Resources available to violent extremists (including both financial and personal) | • Resources remain the same  
  • Resources increase (including ‘game-changers’ / ‘wildcards’, i.e. unexpected significant increase) | Toolkit copes well with both trajectories, as the funds available to violent extremists are not forecast to affect the variety of CVE work and how it is evaluated. |
| Resources available to CVE actors | • Resources remain the same  
  • Resources increase | Yes – as toolkit does not limit itself to interventions / evaluations that have a specific cost. Specifically, the toolkit provides guidance for stakeholders with different levels of budgets in the Design section’s ‘The CVE intervention’ under ‘Costs’, in its ‘CVE evaluation purpose’ section under ‘Economic’, in its ‘CVE evaluation questions’ under ‘Efficiency’, and in its ‘Data |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor category</th>
<th>Factor option delineated as either highly likely or highly impactful</th>
<th>Would the toolkit accommodate these factor trajectories? (based on methodology stages 2 and 4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|                  | "Engagement and outreach / Strengthening community cohesion (including addressing polarisation)" | Yes, but requires reviewing in the future. In summary:  
- The Design, Conduct and Lessons Learned sections allow for evaluations of all types of work, although further categories could be added to more precisely match the future trajectories. Specifically, material in Design includes:  
  - ‘Intervention mechanism’ outlines the following categories of activities: ‘Educational and mentoring’ (describing approaches including both ‘Education and mentoring’, ‘training’) and ‘Social and positive alternatives’.  
  - Guidance provided in line with ‘International approach: collaboration’ includes guidance about how to approach CVE interventions with varying types of geographical coverage. In addition, the toolkit itself is an example of international collaboration.  
- The Methods section provides a variety of approaches that are comprehensive. However, this could be updated, for instance by adding methods such as ‘social media analysis’, as well as guidance in Design on when to use them.  
- The Interventions Database section has search categories that only cover some of these types of approach. Specifically:  
  - Under ‘Activity type’: ‘Educational and mentoring’, ‘Therapeutic’, ‘Enabling organisations’, ‘Informational’, and ‘Sanctioning’. However, this could be made more specific. For instance, ‘Informational’ could be broken down or adapted to cover ‘counter-narratives’ or |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor category</th>
<th>Factor option delineated as either highly likely or highly impactful</th>
<th>Would the toolkit accommodate these factor trajectories? (based on methodology stages 2 and 4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public-private collaboration</td>
<td>- Focusing on the national level (bespoke, i.e. tailoring responses specifically to national context)</td>
<td>'strategic communications'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Greater use of intelligence</td>
<td>- Under ‘Group of focus’: ‘Education sector and religious leaders’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Novel / alternative models</td>
<td>- The Training and Manual components of the toolkit show that the toolkit is cognisant of the CVE field’s need for capacity building going forward.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Use of hard power impacting on CVE (e.g. sanctioning, increasing use of the police and military – both in terms of greater visibility and specific operational aims)</td>
<td>The Interventions Database and the Upload function under Lessons Learned face a challenge in eliciting from stakeholders the uploading of confidential evaluations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Violent extremist approaches**

- Influence operations (aims of maximising media coverage)
- Self-starting cells pledging allegiance
- Cyber-terrorism / cyber attacks
- Spectacular
- Individual / lone actor / lone wolf / self-radicalisation / inclusive (vs. exclusive)
- Marauding terrorism (i.e. small group of armed terrorists launching coordinated attacks, normally on general public, including where this is clearly building on combat experience or other experienced networks)
- Suicide terrorism
- Use of internet and communications / technology
- International collaboration
- Single country focus

Yes, but requires reviewing in the future. The Design section provides relevant content for evaluations of interventions addressing different types of violent extremist approaches, providing examples for some specific scenarios. In addition, the Methods section provides a variety of approaches that are comprehensive. However, it could be updated, for instance by adding methods such as ‘social media analysis’, as well as guidance in Design on when to use them.

The Interventions Database does not have ‘activity type of violent extremists’ as a specific search category, although other coded variables are related to this (e.g. ‘Unit of focus’ and ‘Group target traits’). As there is no such specific search category there is no issue with whether the toolkit can accommodate specific approaches. However, arguably this should be included.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor category</th>
<th>Factor option delineated as either highly likely or highly impactful</th>
<th>Would the toolkit accommodate these factor trajectories? (based on methodology stages 2 and 4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use of crime networks</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Table 5: Findings on how the toolkit would accommodate future factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Factor category</th>
<th>Finding description</th>
<th>Percentage of factor trajectories delineated as highly likely or highly impactful</th>
<th>Estimated extent to which the toolkit appropriately addresses factor category (qualitative assessment by IMPACT Europe team)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1  | ‘Type of violent extremism’ | The toolkit would accommodate this factor category well, but this would require reviewing in the future due to the inherent uncertainty of this fast-changing environment. Specifically, the following could be considered:  
- Evaluation Guide and Lessons Learned: updating of relevant examples.  
- Interventions Database: IMPACT Europe database has a category of ‘political’ (which feeds into other sections). This is relevant, although it could be made more specific to match the identified possible future types of violent extremism. | Likely: 80%  
Impactful: 60% | Medium |
| 2  | ‘Resources available to CVE actors’ and ‘Resources available to violent extremists’ | In terms of resources available to either CVE actors or violent extremists, we found the toolkit copes well with all likely eventualities and did not anticipate an obvious need for a specific review of these categories. | For both CVE actors and violent extremists:  
- Likely: 67%  
- Impactful: 33% | Low |
| 3  | ‘Type of CVE actor’ | The toolkit would accommodate this factor category well but this would require reviewing in the future due to the inherent uncertainty of this fast-changing environment. Specifically, the following could be considered:  
- Evaluation Guide and Lessons Learned: updating of relevant examples (e.g. examples of private sector actors), and new components to more specifically address concerns of certain types of actors (e.g. NGOs).  
- Interventions Database: IMPACT Europe database could be made more specific to match the possible future types of CVE actors identified. | Likely: 100%  
Impactful: NA | Medium |
| 4  | ‘CVE approaches’ | The toolkit would accommodate this factor category well but this would require reviewing in the future. Specifically, the following could be considered: | Likely: 83%  
Impactful: 39% | Medium |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Factor category</th>
<th>Finding description</th>
<th>Percentage of factor trajectories delineated as highly likely or highly impactful</th>
<th>Estimated extent to which the toolkit appropriately addresses factor category (qualitative assessment by IMPACT Europe team)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>'Violent extremist approaches'</td>
<td>The toolkit would accommodate this factor category well but this would require reviewing in the future.</td>
<td>Likely: 65% Impactful: 76%</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Design section provides relevant content for evaluations of different types of interventions, providing examples for some specific scenarios. These examples could be updated in the future. In addition, the Methods section provides a variety of approaches that are comprehensive. However, this could be updated, for instance by adding methods such as 'social media analysis', as well as guidance in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### # Factor category | Finding description | Percentage of factor trajectories delineated as highly likely or highly impactful | Estimated extent to which the toolkit appropriately addresses factor category (qualitative assessment by IMPACT Europe team)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Factor category</th>
<th>Finding description</th>
<th>Percentage of factor trajectories delineated as highly likely or highly impactful</th>
<th>Estimated extent to which the toolkit appropriately addresses factor category (qualitative assessment by IMPACT Europe team)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Design on when to use them.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Interventions Database does not have ‘activity type of violent extremists’ as a specific search category, although other coded variables are related to this (e.g. ‘Unit of focus’ and ‘Group target traits’). As there is no such specific search category there is no issue with whether the toolkit can cope with specific approaches. However, arguably this should be included.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1.4. Conclusions and recommendations

#### 1.4.1. Conclusions

The findings indicate that the toolkit accommodates the various factor trajectories well, although we identified areas where future review would be advisable (see below for timescales for any future review). We outline overall recommendations for such a review under Recommendations below. However, that is not to say this should or can be done at this point, as we are still uncertain about how the future environment will develop.

We identified various ways in which the toolkit may accommodate these different factor trajectories, either with general relevance and consideration, or with specific sections (e.g. the Interventions Database / Evaluation Guide / Lessons Learned sections). We found a slight contrast between the ways in which the different sections accommodate the possible future environment. On the one hand, the Evaluation Guide section was drafted in a flexible manner, anticipating a wide range of possible toolkit users (from government level to NGO, from internal to external evaluators, and from those with no evaluation budget to a high evaluation budget). As such, the fact that many of the different factor trajectories are topic-specific means toolkit users can use the guidance in the Evaluation Guide’s Design and Conduct sections for their purposes in a variety of future environments. On the other hand, the Interventions Database and Lessons Learned sections are more restricted, in that they
are beholden to the database content that was originally collected in 2014 \(^{25}\) (albeit that data also feeds into the Evaluation Guide section both for its design and as examples).

While any review would be well advised to consider all three main sections of the toolkit, based on the contrast described it would seem advisable to prioritise Interventions Database and Lessons Learned. For instance, the issue for European governments of how to deal with returning ‘foreign fighters’ has become increasingly important and is an area that could be looked at for more specific coding in future iterations of the toolkit (see the Factors Matrix’s ‘Government / Intergovernmental organisations’ factor option under the ‘Type of CVE actor’ category).

### 1.4.2. Recommendations

Based on the findings outlined above and in the Factors Matrix on how the toolkit accommodates the different factors of relevance, we developed a series of recommendations for any future review or iteration of the toolkit. Specifically, for every factor option which we identified as requiring future review, we provided initial recommendations for such future consideration. The Factors Matrix describes these in full (see the appendix to this annex). In this section, we provide a more concise list of five recommendations emanating from the key findings outlined above, and which summarise the more detailed recommendations in the Factors Matrix.

A number of the recommendations are relevant across factor categories, while some are unique to particular factor trajectories. We therefore do not cluster the recommendations around the factor categories as we did the findings in the above section. Instead, we summarise crosscutting recommendations in Table 6, referring to the relevant findings as appropriate (all findings are relevant for the recommendations except finding number 2). We have added a priority level column to Table 6 that may be helpful for such a review. Its contents are based on a qualitative assessment by the IMPACT Europe team about the overall utility of the recommendation for toolkit users. We further discuss prioritising and timing below.

**Table 6: Recommendations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Recommendation description</th>
<th>Relevant finding/s (see Table 3)</th>
<th>Level of priority (darker shade indicates higher priority)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Update the search variables for the Interventions Database, which in turn feed into targeted information provided through guidance in the</td>
<td>1, 3, 4 and</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Recommendation description</th>
<th>Relevant finding/s (see Table 3)</th>
<th>Level of priority (darker shade indicates higher priority)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Evaluation Guide section.</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>This would require updating previous coding categories and trajectories, and developing a greater level of granularity of coding these in future iterations of the IMPACT Europe database. More specifically, this would include:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a) Considering making coded variables more specific.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) Splitting categories where appropriate.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c) Creating new coded variable categories (e.g. country of intervention – which is already in the database but not in the condensed search categories of Interventions Database).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d) Adapting previous coding as new coded variables (e.g. joining together the current variables of ‘mechanism’, ‘activities’ and ‘goals’ in a new ‘CVE approach’ variable).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e) General updating of the list of coded variables.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>This would be based on an updated review of sources that was originally done in 2014. The resulting updated data would feed into different parts of the toolkit, from representing fresh sources in Lessons Learned, to being used for updating search variables in Interventions Database, and new examples provided in Evaluation Guide.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Adding new components to guidance under the Evaluation Guide. Specific suggestions based on the Factors Matrix are:</td>
<td>3 and 4</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a) Providing links to expertise on different types of CVE approach (e.g. counter-narratives).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) Drafting guidance specific to NGOs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c) New CVE activity types (e.g. ‘capacity building’).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d) Expanding some current sections (e.g. the Evaluation Guide’s text under ‘Disengage radicalised individuals from a violent extremist group’ could be expanded to cover guidance on evaluating interventions that seek to disengage individuals from ‘an ideology’ – see Design / CVE intervention / CVE intervention goals).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Considering new evaluation methods for the ‘Methods’ section, specifically ‘Social media analysis’. It is likely that the field of evaluation will develop over the coming 5–10 years, and so we anticipate needing to review this area and consider new approaches</td>
<td>4 and 5</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Recommendation description</td>
<td>Relevant finding/s (see Table 3)</td>
<td>Level of priority (darker shade indicates higher priority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and any developments on methods and guidance offered in the toolkit.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Updating and increasing the variety of examples (e.g. based on the growing phenomenon of returning ‘foreign fighters’).</td>
<td>1, 3 and 5</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Engaging new stakeholders to upload / require uploading. This entails addressing concerns about confidentiality, and so it may be advisable to allow stakeholders to upload only limited information where there are security or human rights concerns.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When – as we hope – the time arrives for reviewing the toolkit with a view to updating it for on-going utility, we are hopeful that these recommendations will provide a good starting point for a review plan. In addition to the priority levels offered above, it may also be helpful to consider prioritising areas to look at based on the delineations for levels of likelihood and impact – see Table 3. For instance, we would expect that the factor trajectories that have been considered both highly likely and highly impactful would be prioritised first. There are 18 such factor trajectories (see Table 3), which allow focusing of resources when compared to the full list of 52 factor trajectories outlined in the Factors Matrix.

Finally, it is appropriate to consider the timing for the future review mentioned in numerous instances above. We suggest a two-pronged approach to this. First, given the time elapsed from when the IMPACT Europe database sources were collected (2014), and the pace of on-going research production in this field, we suggest that a review of the literature should be done on an on-going basis – every 6–12 months. This is mentioned in recommendation 1. Second, we suggest that a wider review of the toolkit, to address all of the recommendations outlined, should take place one year from now, and every two years thereafter. We suggest this approach as a way of ensuring the toolkit remains current and useful going forward.
References


Factors Matrix

Overview

This appendix sets out a table that comprises a ‘Factors Matrix’ of factors relevant to the future, as well as input on how the IMPACT Europe toolkit can accommodate future factors. More specifically, the document contains:

a) The Factors Matrix. This outlines the factors (for definitions see below), in the context of Europe, for the IMPACT Europe project’s future-proofing task.

The Factors Matrix shows the list of factors, where each factor is itself a category, with different trajectories. For instance, for ‘type of extremism’, there are different trajectories, including ‘religious’ and ‘extreme right wing’. Each option does not necessarily mean ‘increasing levels of x’ (unless specifically specified), but rather that it would be a relevant factor in the future.

Each option under each factor has been considered, to ascertain whether it is likely to happen, and whether it has a high potential impact (in terms of high level of casualties, property or financial cost / disruption).

The last two columns of the Factors Matrix outline:
- if and how the toolkit can accommodate that factor of the future environment; and
- if it cannot, outlines any recommendation for addressing this.

b) The Trends List sets out the trends identified when reviewing the relevant literature in search of factors. These are relevant as background for how the factors in the Factors Matrix were developed.

Table key

- Factor: An element that influences or contributes to a change in the future system. It can be influenced by trends.
- Likelihood: Is this likely to be a factor in the future (in 5–10 years)
- Impact: High level of casualties, property or financial cost / disruption (impact may be positive or negative). This could be long term or short term, local or international, and strategic or tactical.
Note that the references shown are those identified in the literature review as referring to the factor / trend in the future. ‘IMPACT Europe toolkit’ and ‘Romaniuk’ were used to flesh out other factors and trajectories considered to be relevant, but these were not specifically referring to the future. Finally, ‘Expert judgement’ supplemented these with a view to addressing any gaps not specifically considered in the literature.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor category</th>
<th>Factor option</th>
<th>Likelihood level</th>
<th>Potential impact level</th>
<th>References</th>
<th>Toolkit can accommodate?</th>
<th>Recommendations for future review</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factor: Type of violent extremism</td>
<td>Religious (e.g. Islamist)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Malashenko and Yarlykapov, Linde and van der Duin</td>
<td>Yes:</td>
<td>- Design, Conduct and Lessons Learned: accommodate this, with relevant examples. - Interventions Database: IMPACT Europe database has a category of ‘religious’, feeding into other sections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationalist / separatist</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Expert judgement</td>
<td>Yes, but requires reviewing in the future:</td>
<td>- Design, Conduct and Lessons Learned: accommodate this, with relevant examples. - Interventions Database: IMPACT Europe database has a category of ‘political’, feeding into other sections. This is relevant, although could be more specific.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extreme right wing</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Vidra and Fox, Sedgwick, Navarro and Villaverde, van der Lijn</td>
<td>As above.</td>
<td>As above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extreme left wing</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Expert judgement</td>
<td>As above.</td>
<td>As above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Single issue (e.g. animal rights or environmental activism)</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Navarro and Villaverde</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor: Type of CVE actor</td>
<td>Government / Intergovernment</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>NA as highly subjective,</td>
<td>Navarro and Villaverde</td>
<td>Yes, but requires reviewing in the future:</td>
<td>Consider:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor category</td>
<td>Factor option</td>
<td>Likelihood level</td>
<td>Potential impact level</td>
<td>References</td>
<td>Toolkit can accommodate?</td>
<td>Recommendations for future review</td>
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<tr>
<td>al organisations (including OSCE and UN, but also police, probation services, social care and health care)</td>
<td>difficult to assess and different for each country</td>
<td>Yes, but requires reviewing in the future: material throughout toolkit is relevant for practitioners in these organisations. Examples throughout include ones from government.</td>
<td>- Interventions Database: IMPACT Europe database has a search category under ‘Group of focus’ of ‘policymakers and journalists’, ‘social and healthcare workers’ and ‘criminal justice’. This also feeds into other sections (e.g. see the Beneficiaries section in Design).  - Adding coding category to Interventions Database for more first-line workers.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO (both local and international NGOS, To include single issue organisations)</td>
<td>NA as highly subjective, difficult to assess and different for each country</td>
<td>Expert judgement</td>
<td>Yes, but requires reviewing in the future: material throughout toolkit is relevant for practitioners in NGOs. Examples throughout include ones from NGOs. However, not specifically addressed.</td>
<td>Consider new content to specifically provide guidance only relevant to NGOs. This could include guidance on costs of evaluations and suggestions for obtaining funding for evaluations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community / grass roots (including online communities, e.g. Anonymous)</td>
<td>NA as highly subjective, difficult to assess and different for each country</td>
<td>Expert judgement</td>
<td>Yes, but requires reviewing in the future. Material throughout toolkit is relevant for practitioners in community / grass roots organisations, and there are examples such as ones under the Design section about CVE evaluation questions that refer to community resilience (under ‘Effectiveness’ questions). However, examples of CVE interventions and their evaluations in community / grass roots organisations could be further explored.</td>
<td>Consider new key search terms when conducting any future literature review. Consider further examples of this type of CVE actor.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education institutions</td>
<td>NA as highly subjective,</td>
<td>Expert judgement</td>
<td>Yes, but requires reviewing in the future: material throughout toolkit is relevant for</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Split this search category in the Interventions Database section into two (for the education and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor category</td>
<td>Factor option</td>
<td>Likelihood level</td>
<td>Potential impact level</td>
<td>References</td>
<td>Toolkit can accommodate?</td>
<td>Recommendations for future review</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Religious institutions  |                                                                               | High             | NA as highly subjective, difficult to assess and different for each country | Expert judgement                                                                        | Yes, but requires reviewing in the future: material throughout toolkit is relevant for practitioners in religious institutions. Examples throughout include ones from such institutions. In addition, material is provided under the Interventions Database as follows:  
- There is a search category under ‘Group of focus’ of ‘Education sector and religious leaders’. This also feeds into other sections (e.g. see the Beneficiaries section in Design).  
- There is a search category under ‘Cultural factors affecting radicalisation’ of ‘Religious interpretation’ and ‘religious intolerance’. | As above.                                                                                     |
<p>| Private sector (including social media companies, online actors, and tech) |                                                                               | High             | NA as highly subjective, difficult to assess and different for each country | Expert judgement                                                                        | Yes, but requires reviewing in the future: material throughout toolkit is relevant for these, but could be made more specifically relevant for them. For instance, there is a search category of ‘Communities’ in the Interventions Database, but nothing specific. | Consider new key search terms when conducting any future literature review. Consider further examples of this type of CVE actor. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor category</th>
<th>Factor option</th>
<th>Likelihood level</th>
<th>Potential impact level</th>
<th>References</th>
<th>Toolkit can accommodate?</th>
<th>Recommendations for future review</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resources available to violent extremists (including both financial and personal)</td>
<td>Resources remain the same</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Hoffman, Bowman</td>
<td>Yes – as toolkit was cognisant of the current funding environment and was designed with this in mind.</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources increase (including ‘game-changers’ / ‘wildcards’, i.e. unexpected significant increase)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Hoffman, Bowman (about finances), Vidra and Fox, Sedgwick, Navarro and Villaverde, van der Lijn, Linde and van der Duin (about professionalisation), Expert judgement (about wildcard)</td>
<td>This may pose a bigger problem for CVE practitioners, but it is not forecast to affect the variety of CVE work and how it is evaluated. It may result in increased resources for CVE work – see below.</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources decrease</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Expert judgement</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources available to CVE actors</td>
<td>Resources remain the same</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Expert judgement</td>
<td>Yes – as toolkit was cognisant of the current funding environment and was designed with this in mind. Specifically, guidance provided in the Design section’s ‘The CVE intervention’ under ‘Costs’, in its ‘CVE evaluation purpose’ section under ‘Economic’, in its ‘CVE evaluation questions’ under ‘Efficiency’, and in its ‘Data collection’ section under...</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor category</td>
<td>Factor option</td>
<td>Likelihood level</td>
<td>Potential impact level</td>
<td>References</td>
<td>Toolkit can accommodate?</td>
<td>Recommendations for future review</td>
</tr>
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</table>
| Resources increase | High         | High            | Expert judgement       | ‘Sampling’. Costs available for evaluation are also covered in the Conduct section under ‘Management’.
|                 |              |                 |                        | Yes – as toolkit does not limit itself to interventions / evaluations that have a specific cost. A higher budget would in fact allow the toolkit to be used to its full potential. Specifically, guidance provided in the Design section’s ‘The CVE intervention’ under ‘Costs’, in its ‘CVE evaluation purpose’ section under ‘Economic’, in its ‘CVE evaluation questions’ under ‘Efficiency’, and in its ‘Data collection’ section under ‘Sampling’. Costs available for evaluation are also covered in the Conduct section under ‘Management’.
| Resources decrease | Medium   | Medium           | Expert judgement       | NA         | NA                       |
| Factor: CVE approaches | High       | Medium          | Martin, Romaniuk       | Yes, but requires reviewing in the future:
- Design and Conduct and Lessons Learned sections allow for evaluations of this type of work.
- The Interventions Database section does not have an activity to search by that is specifically in line with this.
|                | Education and mentoring | High | Medium | Romaniuk, IMPACT Europe Toolkit category and expert | Yes, but requires reviewing in the future. Material throughout toolkit is relevant for educational activities. Specifically, material in Design includes ‘Educational and
|               |                        |      |        |                                           | Split the ‘Education sector and religious leaders’ search category in the Interventions Database section into two (for the education and religious
<p>|</p>
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<tr>
<th>Factor category</th>
<th>Factor option</th>
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<th>Toolkit can accommodate?</th>
<th>Recommendations for future review</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Capacity building (including skills and capabilities) and training (either domestic or international) | High | Medium | Romaniuk and expert judgement (not specifically future based) | mentoring’ as a category of activities under ‘Intervention mechanism’. Material is provided under the Interventions database as follows:  
- There is a search category under ‘Activity type’ of ‘Educational and mentoring’.  
- There is a search category under ‘Group of focus’ of ‘Education sector and religious leaders’. This also feeds into other sections (e.g. see the Beneficiaries section in Design). | Yes, but requires reviewing in the future: Material throughout toolkit is relevant for capacity-building activities. Specifically, material in Design includes input on training activities under the heading ‘Educational and mentoring’ (category of activities under ‘Intervention mechanism’). Material is provided under the Interventions Database’s ‘Activity type’ search category as follows:  
- ‘Educational and mentoring’, where some training is outlined.  
- ‘Enabling organisations’, where an intervention about empowering street-level workers through training is described. In addition, the Training and Manual components of the toolkit show that the toolkit is cognisant of the CVE field’s need for capacity building going forward. | Consider:  
- Adding an activity type under Design / The CVE Intervention / Activities called ‘Capacity building’  
- Adding search categories of ‘Training’ and ‘Capacity building’ to the Interventions Database section |
| Use of technological / | High | Medium | Expert judgement | Yes, but requires reviewing in the future: Design, Conduct and Lessons | Consider:  
- Adding coding variable of ‘CVE |
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<td></td>
<td>innovative developments (e.g. by Google)</td>
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<td>NA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Social and positive alternatives</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Learned sections allow for evaluations of this type of work.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Consider:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- The Interventions Database section does not have an activity to search by that is specifically in line with this.</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Add to the Methods section 'social media analysis' and possibly other media analysis and guidance in Design on when to use them.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes. Material throughout toolkit is relevant for educative activities.</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Adding coding variable of 'CVE approach' in any future updates of the IMPACT Europe database.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Specifically, material in Design includes ‘Social and positive alternatives’ as a category under ‘Intervention mechanism’.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Note that it may be possible to simply translate the current variables of ‘mechanism’, ‘activities’ and ‘goals’ to arrive at this, supplementing with new and emerging trajectories.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Material is provided under the Interventions Database; there is a search category under ‘Activity type’ of ‘Educational and mentoring’.</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Adding a wider variety of examples in future iterations of Design.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Messaging 1 of 5: Using counter-narratives (e.g. using websites and social media, Strategic Communications )</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Cozzens, Bermingham et al., Navarro and Villaverde, Linde and van der Duin, Nacos</td>
<td></td>
<td>Consider:</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Yes, but requires reviewing in the future:</td>
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<td>- Add to the Methods section 'social media analysis' and possibly other media analysis and guidance in Design on when to use them.</td>
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<td>- Design, Conduct and Lessons Learned sections allow for evaluations of this type of work.</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Adding coding variable of ‘CVE approach’ in any future updates of the IMPACT Europe database.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- The Interventions Database section allows searching by Intervention / Activity / Informational. However, this could</td>
<td></td>
<td>Note that it may be possible to simply translate the current variables of ‘mechanism’, ‘activities’ and ‘goals’ to arrive at this, supplementing with new and emerging trajectories.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>be made more specific, for instance to Strategic Communications.</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Adding a wider variety of examples in future iterations of Design.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Messaging 2 of 5: Addressing identities and</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Cozzens</td>
<td></td>
<td>Consider:</td>
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<td>- Design and Conduct sections allow for evaluations of this type of work.</td>
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<td>Note that it may be possible to simply translate the current variables of ‘mechanism’, ‘activities’ and ‘goals’ to arrive at this, supplementing with new and emerging trajectories.</td>
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<td>beliefs</td>
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<td>- The Interventions Database</td>
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<td>section does not have an activity</td>
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<td>to search by that is specifically</td>
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<td>in line with this.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Messaging 3 of 5: emphasising the covenant of security (allegiance to host country)</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Cozzens, Expert judgement, Romaniuk (on messaging as a current category)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>- may be possible to simply translate the current variables of ‘mechanism’, ‘activities’ and ‘goals’ to arrive at this, supplementing with new and emerging trajectories.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Messaging 4 of 5: Emphasising the legal framework through ongoing policy (e.g. national programmes such as Prevent)</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Expert judgement</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Messaging 5 of 5: Emphasising the religious framework (e.g. use of religious or theological leaders in prisons, and engaging with theological and jurisprudential</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Expert judgement</td>
<td>Yes, but requires reviewing in the future:</td>
<td>Consider:</td>
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<td>- Adding coding variable of ‘CVE approach’ in any future updates of the IMPACT Europe database. Note that it may be possible to simply translate the current variables of ‘mechanism’, ‘activities’ and ‘goals’ to arrive at this, supplementing with new and emerging trajectories.</td>
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<td>- Adding a wider variety of examples in future.</td>
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<td>- Add links to expertise on the counter-narrative approach.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Therapeutic / emphasising ideological and psychological corpuses</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Expert judgement and IMPACT Europe toolkit</td>
<td>Yes, but requires reviewing in the future: - Design, Conduct and Lessons Learned sections allow for evaluations of this type of work. - The Interventions Database section allows searching by Intervention / Activity / Therapeutic and Enabling Organisations. However, this could be made more specific.</td>
<td>Consider: - Adding coding variable of ‘CVE approach’ in any future updates of the IMPACT Europe database. Note that it may be possible to simply translate the current variables of ‘mechanism’, ‘activities’ and ‘goals’ to arrive at this, supplementing with new and emerging trajectories. - Adding a wider variety of examples in future iterations of Design.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International approach (1 of 2): Taking a diplomatic approach (i.e. foreign policy)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Expert judgement</td>
<td>Yes, but requires reviewing in the future: - Design, Conduct and Lessons Learned sections allow for evaluations of this type of work. - The Interventions Database section does not have an activity to search by that is specifically in line with this. - However, issues surrounding uploading of confidential evaluations.</td>
<td>Consider: - Adding coding variable of ‘CVE approach’ in any future updates of the IMPACT Europe database. Note that it may be possible to simply translate the current variables of ‘mechanism’, ‘activities’ and ‘goals’ to arrive at this, supplementing with new and emerging trajectories. - Adding a wider variety of examples in future iterations of Design. - Adding information about ‘diplomatic approaches’ under the Lessons Learned section (in the ‘Intervention implementation’ part of the project lifecycle section). - Engage stakeholders to upload / require uploading – even if only limited information can be submitted due to security or human rights concerns.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>International approach (2 of 2): collaboration</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Hoffman, Navarro and Villaverde, Linde and van der Duin</td>
<td>Yes, but requires reviewing in the future: - Design, Conduct and Lessons Learned sections allow for evaluations of this type of work. The Design section also provides guidance about how to approach CVE interventions with varying</td>
<td>As above.</td>
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<td>Factor category</td>
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<td>Public-private collaboration</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Yeap and Park</td>
<td>Yes, but requires reviewing in the future:</td>
<td>Consider:</td>
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<td>- The toolkit itself is an example of international collaboration.</td>
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<td>Focusing on the national level (bespoke, i.e. tailoring responses specifically to national context)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Hoffman, Navarro and Villaverde</td>
<td>Yes, but requires reviewing in the future:</td>
<td>Consider:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Design, Conduct and Lessons Learned sections allow for evaluations of this type of work.</td>
<td>- Adding a ‘search by country’ category and possibly also a ‘search by language’ category.</td>
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<td>- The Interventions Database section does not have an activity to search by that is specifically in line with this.</td>
<td>- Adding coding variable of ‘CVE approach’ in any future updates of the IMPACT Europe database. Note that it may be possible to simply translate the current variables of ‘mechanism’, ‘activities’ and ‘goals’ to arrive at this, supplementing with new and emerging trajectories.</td>
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<td>- The Interventions Database section does not have an activity to search by that is specifically in line with this.</td>
<td>- Adding a wider variety of examples in future iterations of Design.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greater use of intelligence</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Expert judgement</td>
<td>Yes, but requires reviewing in the future:</td>
<td>Consider:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Novel / alternative models</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Expert judgement</td>
<td>Yes, but requires reviewing in the future:</td>
<td>Yes, but requires reviewing in the future:</td>
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<td>- Design, Conduct and Lessons Learned sections allow for evaluations of this type of work.</td>
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<td><strong>Recommendations for future review</strong></td>
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</table>

**Consider:**
- Adding a wider variety of examples in future iterations of Design.
- Engage stakeholders to upload/require uploading – even if only limited information can be submitted due to security or human rights concerns.

**Factor: Violent extremist approaches**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use of hard power impacting on CVE (e.g. sanctioning, increasing use of the police and military – both in terms of greater visibility and specific operational aims)</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>IMPACT Europe toolkit and expert judgement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, but requires reviewing in the future:</td>
<td>Design, Conduct and Lessons Learned sections allow for evaluations of this type of work.</td>
<td>Yes, but requires reviewing in the future:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Design, Conduct and Lessons Learned sections allow for evaluations of this type of work.</td>
<td>The Interventions Database section allows searching by Intervention / Activity / Sanctioning. However, this could be made more specific.</td>
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<td>Design, Conduct and Lessons Learned sections allow for evaluations of this type of work.</td>
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</table>

**Consider:**
- Adding coding variable of ‘CVE approach’ in any future updates of the IMPACT Europe database. Note that it may be possible to simply translate the current variables of ‘mechanism’, ‘activities’ and ‘goals’ to arrive at this, supplementing with new and emerging trajectories.
- Adding a wider variety of examples in future iterations of Design.

**Recommendations for future review**
- Adding a wider variety of examples in future iterations of Design.
- Engage stakeholders to upload/require uploading – even if only limited information can be submitted due to security or human rights concerns.
- Consider:
  - Adding a coding variable of ‘CVE approach’ in any future updates of the IMPACT Europe database. Note that it may be possible to simply translate the current variables of ‘mechanism’, ‘activities’ and ‘goals’ to arrive at this, supplementing with new and emerging trajectories.
  - Adding a wider variety of examples in future iterations of Design.

**Factor: Guerilla warfare / insurgency / unconventional warfare / irregular warfare / long war**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Hoffman, Navarro and Villaverde</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, but requires reviewing in the future.</td>
<td>Design section provides relevant content for evaluations of different types of interventions, providing examples for some specific scenarios.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Design section provides relevant content for evaluations of different types of interventions, providing examples for some specific scenarios.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Interventions Database does not have a</td>
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<td>Consider:</td>
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<td>Use of crime networks</td>
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2. Annex 2 – Targeted update of evaluations

Authors: Dianne van Hemert and Helma van den Berg, TNO

WP2 (Analysis of the state of the art) consisted of an analysis of relevant radicalisation factors, counter-radicalisation interventions, and evaluations thereof. As the data were collected in the first half of 2014, it seems likely that the intervening period has seen relevant developments in the field of evaluations of counter-radicalisation interventions. Within the limited time and resources available, we explored the extent to which minor updates were feasible. We searched for recent qualitative and quantitative peer-reviewed evaluations. In addition, we explored the extent to which alternative approaches, such as restorative justice and theory of change, have been subject to peer-reviewed assessments.

2.1. Exploration of updated WP2 evaluations

In 2014, an exhaustive search for peer-reviewed evaluations and assessments was performed in a number of scientific databases. This search yielded 190,365 hits, of which 52 were deemed relevant for inclusion into the WP2 database, which was the basis of the toolkit. Running an identical search in January 2017 yielded 80,964 hits. Table 1 shows the number of hits for each of the searches in different databases. It should be noted that two searches, i.e., “counter AND terrorism AND programme” and “terrorism AND intervention AND assessment” were not performed in WP2 but were added in the scientific article that was published on this work. For the sake of completeness they were added here as well.

In WP2, the number of hits from Google Scholar was deemed too large to assess in its totality; it was used to scan whether important new hits could be added to the hits from the other databases. However, even after ignoring the Google Scholar hits, the total number (2,134) was too large to analyse at this point of the project. It could be concluded that there is on-going (and possibly even increasing) attention to evaluating counter-violent extremism interventions.

A quick analysis of (part of) the 2,134 hits revealed that relevant studies were very difficult to find. Most retrieved studies were either off-topic (for example, dealing with cancer treatments) or concerned interventions to deal with trauma after terrorist attacks or war. One notable exception was an article by Feddes et al. They report on a longitudinal evaluation of a resilience training that might be used to prevent violent radicalisation, Before and after the training, participants were asked to fill out psychological questionnaires to measure, among other things, their agency, self-esteem, attitudes toward ideology-based violence, empathy and perspective taking.

27 Feddes et al. (2015).
Table 1: Results of literature search on evaluations of counter-violent extremism interventions

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Note: The numbers of search results are shown for 2014/2017.

28 Search was not included in the original WP2 work.
29 Search was not included in the original WP2 work.
30 TNO has no access to Web of Science, so this search was not replicated.
2.2. Alternative approaches to interventions and evaluations

The approach to identifying and judging evaluations in WP2 was a psychological one. This means that the main perspective in the work underlying the WP2 database viewed (violent) radicalisation as behaviour shown by individuals (including maintaining relations with others, actions, utterings, appearances and attitudes). Consequently, counter-radicalisation interventions are viewed as the process of changing behaviour and evaluations of interventions were assessed from this psychological-methodological perspective. This comprised a focus on measuring changes in observable and measurable behaviours.

During the course of the IMPACT Europe project, several alternative approaches to assessing and evaluating the effectiveness of counter-radicalisation interventions have been suggested. These approaches do not directly address behaviour of violent extremists, but focus on the method that was used. We will address two of those approaches and discuss evaluation efforts or possibilities in these domains.

2.2.1. Alternative approach to countering violent extremism: restorative justice

Besides described interventions countering violent extremism, there are no doubt many other viable options. An example is restorative justice. Restorative justice is a method, policy, or belief that communication and dialogue between harm-doers and harm victims has restorative value for all involved. This holds especially true for especially for victims. Justice is, in this sense, not only viewed as being executed by the government or a state. It is relevant for society and (suffering) individuals. It is often contrasted with more punitive methods of dealing with wrongdoing.31

Restorative justice resembles theories about resolving conflict between individuals or groups through contact or dialogue. For example, a relatively early psychology theory called the intergroup contact theory, or the contact hypothesis, maintains that groups experiencing conflict can benefit from interpersonal contact by reducing prejudice and increasing understanding and appreciation between individuals belonging to different groups.32

In the database that was delivered alongside Deliverable 2.2, several interventions were included that build on the contact hypothesis (i.e. engaging in dialogue) and therefore share similar starting points to restorative justice. Thus, although restorative justice as such is not included in the database, the theoretical underpinning and similar interventions are included. For the IMPACT Europe project, restorative justice is important predominantly as a potential intervention strategy aimed at victims and perpetrators who have already engaged in crimes related to violent extremism (i.e. terrorism).

Because the focus of restorative justice is on resolving conflict after a crime has been committed, research on restorative justice and countering violent extremism is expected to be scarce. Indeed, a search in SCOPUS yielded zero results when searching for restorative

31 Braithwaite (2004).
32 Allport (1954).
justice and violent extremism. A search with restorative justice and radicalisation gave one result written in a non-English (Slavic) language. Another search in SCOPUS focusing on restorative justice in combination with terrorism yielded nine results. Of these articles, only one described an intervention targeted at diminishing violent extremism. The remaining four were focused on the role of restorative justice in forgiving terrorists, and four others were not focused on interventions at all.

The article that described the intervention points to the use of restorative justice in helping to resolve on-going conflicts between groups. Whereas restorative justice is focused on reducing negative effects of crimes, especially for people who were the victim of a crime, it could also be a viable option for members of groups that have a history of conflict. However, it can also be used for groups that have a long tradition as rivals. Examples are the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, or the conflict between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda. In a case study on Arab and Jewish offenders and victims, Umbreit and Ritter found that dialogue resulted in improved relations between families of offenders and families of victims.

Recent viable approaches related to restorative justice include transformative education to develop community resilience, transitional justice, and the use of former combatants. In a description of how to implement a balanced restorative justice model, a description is given of how to execute this intervention most effectively, including relevant questions on how to measure outcomes.

2.2.2. Alternative approach to evaluation: programme theory

As an alternative approach to evaluations, programme theory was used to guide the evaluation of the IMPACT Europe toolkit, as described in D3.2. According to this memo:

programme theory ‘links programme activities to outputs, outcomes and impact, and makes explicit the underlying assumptions about how programmes are expected to work (…). A programme theory includes two parts: a theory of change (which describes the mechanisms producing the change) and a theory of action (how the programme will activate the mechanisms in order to produce its desired change).

In addition, the D3.2 memo notes that:

Funnell and Rogers define a programme theory as an explicit theory or model of how an intervention, such as a project, a programme, a strategy, an initiative or a policy contributes to a chain of intermediate results and finally to the intended or observed outcomes. (...) The theory-based evaluation approach helps in opening the ‘black

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33 (radical* alone yielded 7260 results, and violent extremism alone yielded 343 results).
35 For a description, see MIVILUDES (undated).
36 Ibid.
37 Taylor et al. (2016); Spalek and Weeks (2016).
38 Mühlhausen (2016).
39 Clubb (2016).
40 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (undated).
41 Funnell and Rogers (2011).
box’ of programmes: it explores the steps in the causal chains, leading from programme inputs to final outcomes. It therefore allows the evaluator to investigate the role of various contexts and circumstances in determining the actual occurring outcomes.42

In the database that underlies the toolbox, articles on the theory of change were included from the beginning, although they were not specifically addressed. For example, Lub (2013) evaluates the validity of theories of change of anti-polarisation and anti-radicalisation interventions by confronting assumptions of four dominant social policies with the literature.43 He states that the potential of the four policy approaches depends in great measure on their conceptualisation of ‘polarisation’ or ‘radicalisation’. A focus on interventions could be dismissed as naive when no account is offered of wider sociopolitical factors fuelling radicalisation or ethnic tensions.

Programme theory enables evaluation of all aspects of an intervention and allows for idiosyncrasies of specific interventions. Because of this combination of generality and specificity, evaluations usually concern case studies or generic policy descriptions. These methods preclude a systematic and replicable measurement.

2.3. Future suggestions

Based on our investigation, we conclude that alternative approaches such as restorative justice might be considered for future use. As the underlying principles are similar to psychological theories such as the contact hypothesis, the structure of the toolkit is suitable for including future studies on the application of restorative justice in the domain of CVE interventions.

Examples of programme theory evaluations generally concern case studies. There is, so far, a lack of replicable studies applying restorative justice and programme theory to radicalisation, and in particular the evaluation of interventions. The dearth of standardised measures and indicators for assessing behavioural change as a result of deradicalisation interventions is, in part, due to the complexity of the human perceptual, cognitive, behavioural, and social systems through which these interventions work – factors that are not amenable to simplified understanding, or to quantification.

However, even in domains where there is a lack of opportunities to quantitatively measure behaviour change, such as military operations, Measures of Performance and Measures of Effectiveness have been found to help to push the field forward in terms of evaluations. The Research and Technology Organization technical report on measuring the effectiveness of influence activities states that any change resulting from any operation may be identified as an effect, whereas the effectiveness of an action refers to the degree to which the actions have realised the effects desired.44 According to this distinction, we could identify Measures of Performance (MOP), i.e., the performance of interventions or professionals during

42 Ibid.
43 Lub (2013).
44 NATO (2011).
interventions, and Measures of Effectiveness (MOE), i.e., the effectiveness of these performances in terms of the desired effects.\textsuperscript{45}

The NATO Research and Technical Organization technical report on measuring the effectiveness of Influence activities is the most comprehensive report in this area. It states that so-called impact indicators are things that can be assessed to provide insight into the effect. The question that should be answered is: 'What can I measure or assess to find out if I have achieved my goal?' Impact indicators may be defined as changes in attitudes or behaviours, which are two primary aims of Information Operations. Attitudes are harder to observe, measure and analyse than behaviours. Also, a threshold is a criterion for the desired outcome; in other words, 'How much change do I want to see in order to conclude that my activities have been successful?'

The technical report outlines a seven-step approach to prepare MOEs of influence activities, which can be applied to counter-violent radicalisation interventions: (1) Define the effects you want to achieve; (2) Define impact indicators for each effect, which are measurable concepts that indicate attitudinal and behavioural change; (3) Define thresholds, which identify the level of change necessary to conclude that you have been successful; (4) Specify data collection methods; (5) Specify data analysis techniques; (6) Specify activities to undertake in order to achieve the desired effects (interventions); and (7) Define separately indicators of effectiveness, to help determine the degree to which your actions led to changes in the impact indicators. In sum, this method allows for a combination of process measures as well as effectiveness measures.

\textsuperscript{45} See also Van den Berg, Van Hemert, and De Koning (2012).
References


MIVILUDES (undated). Le dispositif juridique français. Last accessed 25 June 2017: http://www.derives-sectes.gouv.fr/quest-ce-quune-d%C3%A9rive-sectaire/que-dit-la-loi/le-dispositif-juridique-fran%C3%A7ais


Author: Liliana Leone, CEVAS

3.1. Introduction

The first part of this annex will rapidly explore the theoretical corpus and practices of internet addiction prevention. As literature ascribes a role to the internet in promoting radicalisation, we explore how and whether internet addiction prevention could be used to further develop the CVE field in order to prevent and counter online radicalisation.

By outlining a common framework, we will illustrate a classification of prevention approaches useful to compare programme theories and transfer some lessons from other fields of policy (internet addiction prevention, prevention of abuse of illicit substances and alcohol, crime prevention, and finally prevention of violent radicalisation).

The second part of the annex will explore the potential contribution of different restorative justice approaches to the CVE field – particularly in relation to the development of new deradicalisation and treatment programmes targeting people involved in minor crimes classed as violent extremism.

3.2. Internet addiction prevention approaches

3.2.1. Internet addiction theories

Internet addiction can be defined as overuse of the internet leading to impairment of an individual’s psychological state (both mental and emotional), as well as their scholastic or occupational and social interactions (Beard and Wolf, 2001). Problematic use of computers and the internet is a growing social issue with prevalence rates in the USA and EU between 1.5% and 8.2% (Weinstein and Lejoyeux). Internet addiction is not considered a formal disorder with a specific diagnosis because its symptoms are likely to be those of other disorders, such as depression or obsessive-compulsive disorders.

The etiology of internet addiction disorder offers several models which explain the development and maintenance of IAD; that is, how and why some youngsters become addicted to internet. Among them, the most used, as identified by Cash et al. (2012:293), are as follows:

- The cognitive-behavioural model of problematic internet use;
- The anonymity, convenience and escape (ACE) model;
- The access, affordability, anonymity (Triple-A) engine;
• A phases model of pathological internet use by Grohol;

• The comprehensive model of the development and maintenance of internet addiction by Winkler and Dörsing, which takes into account socio-cultural factors (e.g., demographic factors, access to and acceptance of the internet), biological vulnerabilities, psychological characteristics, and specific attributes of the internet.

3.2.2. Internet addiction prevention: approaches and interventions

3.2.2.1. Classification of prevention approaches and treatment strategies

The official classification of prevention approaches, used by international centres of research about health promotion and drug addiction such as European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) of the US government, the Canadian Center on Substance Abuse (CCSA) and the Center for Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP-SAMHSA),\textsuperscript{46} refers to three types of prevention (Mrazek and Haggerty, 1994), which are complementary to one another. Prevention approaches are usually categorised as: (1) universal; (2) selective; and (3) indicated.

There is a fourth type of approach, termed the ‘environmental’ approach, which is also used in the sector of drug prevention and alcohol abuse, which comes from the sector of crime prevention. It is a multi-disciplinary approach aimed at deterring criminal behaviours through environmental design (Clarke and Jeffery 1971; Newnman 1972): guidelines addressed to police, town planners and architects for the design of the built environment and public housing in order to reduce opportunities for robbery, burglary and crime, and to enable residents to carry out surveillance of the public areas around their buildings.

The first four approaches categorise interventions according to the level of vulnerability of the target groups, while the fifth takes into account the environments in which people make choices:

• The \textbf{universal approach} addresses the whole populations and aims to change norm perceptions, values, skills and knowledge. These prevention strategies are designed to reach an entire population, without regard to individual risk factors, and as such are designed to reach a very large audience. The program is provided to everyone in a given population, such as a school or community and aims to deliver interventions that may be addressed to adults, teachers and key witnesses, and the final beneficiaries are usually all the students and young people of a community regardless of their level of risk for drug use. These programmes may contain components about ‘normative education’ (statistics about the real rate of consumption) and life-skill (World Health Organisation life-skill training).

• The \textbf{selective approach} delivers programs targeting subgroups of the general population that are considered to be at risk for substance abuse or other dangerous

\textsuperscript{46} SAMHSA is the agency within the US Department of Health and Human Services that leads public health efforts to advance the behavioural health of the nation. SAMHSA's mission is to reduce the impact of substance abuse and mental illness on America's communities.
behaviours. Recipients of selective prevention strategies are known to have specific risk factors. For example, children of substance-abusing parents are usually considered an at-risk subgroup. Selective prevention strategies target groups of adolescents who live in high-crime or impoverished neighbourhoods and are considered at risk of becoming early school-leavers or NEETs, or for involvement in illegal and criminal activities.

- **The indicated approach** uses interventions delivering special programmes for individuals who present early signs of substance abuse and other related problem behaviours associated with substance abuse. In some prevention schemes, young people arrested for the possession of a low quantity of illegal substances may have a mandatory interview with social services of the Territorial Office of the Government (Leone, 2008) and a mandatory treatment managed by the local health services.

- **The harm reduction approach** focuses on the risks and consequences of substance use rather than on the use itself. It remains neutral about abstinence from substance use as well as the adoption of a compulsory behaviour, and is considered a pragmatic response. It has been developed in the sector of illicit substance use and accepts the fact that many people use substances; it considers a drug-free society to be an unrealistic and impractical goal of policies (Pouline 2006).

- **The environmental prevention approach** aims at modifying the physical setting, as well as the immediate cultural, social, physical and economic environments. It addresses society and different social environments and targets social norms including market regulations. The theory of crime prevention through environmental design is based on the idea that crime results partly from the opportunities presented in the physical environment. The assumption is that it should be possible to alter the physical environment – instead of individual attitudes – so that crime is less likely to occur. Examples of the environmental approach include:
  
  - Situational crime prevention: a famous model of environmental prevention that was developed by the British government’s criminological research department in the mid-1970s and according to the main author (Clarke) is:
    
    *a general approach to reducing the opportunities for any kind of crime, occurring in any kind of setting, including airline hijackings, welfare frauds, obscene phone calls, pub violence and domestic violence, as well as the conventional predatory offenses.*
  
  - Regulatory measures: these may dissuade or punish some behaviours, may influence mechanisms of choice and consumption of goods/services by influencing prices or through the imposition of access restrictions on some places, goods or services (e.g. restriction related to age, rules about anonymity, limitation on quantity, time of consumption of alcohol).

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47 Young people aged 16–24 Not in Education, Employment or Training.
Internet addiction prevention and treatment interventions

Internet addiction prevention measures may target individuals, family, groups, adults (teachers, parents), school contexts and communities, and may consist of:

   a) Social cognitive measures and learning models aimed at individuals, groups or classes;
   b) Information campaigns aimed at large population (information strategy, normative strategy);
   c) Counselling and social cognitive measures aimed at significant others (usually parents and family);
   d) Environmental prevention measures and community-based interventions (e.g. specific rules and limitations on the use of public spaces with internet access);

Preventive education on internet addiction is quite important in getting students to recognise the risk of internet addiction and to practice appropriate use of the internet from the outset.

Treatments of internet addiction are adopted to reduce the risk factors associated with IA, such as depression, social anxiety, low self-esteem, low self-efficacy and high stress vulnerability (Brand, Laier and Young, 2014). Studies addressing treatment of internet addiction are limited in number; however, a review (Winkler et al. 2013) argues that cognitive-behavioural therapy is the method of choice (outcome variables were time spent online, depression, and anxiety symptoms). Many programmes are based on social-cognitive theories of behaviour change, such as the Theory of Planned Behaviour or Action which assumes that cognition guides intentions and, consequently, behaviour of individuals, and Bandura’s social cognitive theory of learning.

Young (1999) offers a description of treatment interventions coming from the cognitive-behavioural strategy (Wang, Wu, Lau 2016; Brand, Laier and Young, 2014):

   • Improving skills associated with internet use such as self-efficacy and positive expectancy about internet use;
   • Practicing opposite time of internet use (discovering contrasting patterns and suggesting new habits), using external stoppers (activities prompting the person to log off);
   • Setting goals (e.g. amount of time online) or abstention from a particular application;
   • Entering a support group (compensates for a lack of social support);
   • Engaging in family therapy (addresses relational problems in the family).
The contents of a typical integrated internet addiction prevention program targeting students (Mun and Lee, 2015) are:

- Behavioural modification methods
- Exploring life change from the internet
- Methods of controlling internet use
- Setting behavioural goals
- Reinforcement with rewards for active participation
- Controlling stress
- Communicating emotions effectively
- Practice of self-control, relaxation techniques
- Improving interpersonal relationships.

3.2.2.2 Assumptions and hypotheses about the utility of internet addiction prevention in the CVE field

What are the links between internet addiction and radicalisation?

Several explanatory models have been developed to understand the process of online radicalisation and terrorism. According a recent review (von Behr, Reading, Edwards and Gribbon, 2012:16), the internet could influence radicalisation processes in a number of different ways. The internet may be conceived as a means or as a concurrent factor that facilitates radicalisation. Terrorism, as well as other forms of proselytism, may be conceived as a form of marketing and the use of social media and the web is a powerful tool of successful marketing campaigns.

Torok (2013) adopted a grounded theory approach and conceptualised the internet as a type of ‘institution’ in which the framework of power operates and seeks to recruit and radicalise. His paper illustrates the use of discourse and networked power relations in order to normalise and modify thoughts and behaviours.

We identified and synthesised two main mechanisms:

- **The internet as a driver:** The internet creates more opportunities to contact and influence a broader range of people and target groups, amplifying the impact of communication. The internet makes it possible to reach those individuals who otherwise would not have been reachable by radicalisers (Neumann 2012). For example, the internet may break down some social and material barriers that exist in the physical world, such as gender. The recruitment of young women who are not allowed to meet men or to express their thoughts in public is facilitated by the internet, which affords them anonymity. A consequence of the use of social media is

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that radicalisation processes may be triggered and occur without any physical or even personal contact.

- **Normalisation mechanism:** Acting as an ‘echo chamber’, propaganda on the internet facilitates rapid radicalisation because a behaviour or an attitude usually considered socially unacceptable or inappropriate may be endorsed by a large virtual community that shares values and social norms. The online environment offers an important context for normalising radical thinking and behaviour – according to Torok (2013:7):

  *Once terrorists have targeted sympathizers, the vulnerable or disaffected, their next task is to achieve a transformation; to ‘normalize’ the way in which they should think and ultimately act. Discipline and regularity are essential elements in order to normalize aberrant behaviours.*

According to Torok, internet addiction is not the first step of the causal chain but is a key element in sustaining the radicalisation process:

*Online users achieve this order and socialization through their own regular or compulsive internet use that has a narrow focus on a particular group of rationalities* (Torok, 2013:8).

Torok (2013), who developed an explanatory model for the process of online radicalisation, holds that a key aspect of engagement is enabling the individual to self-disclose. The model conceptualises the internet as a type of institution and applies concepts such as the use of a discourse and networked power relations in order to normalise and modify thoughts and behaviours (in this way, Torok’s model bears a relation to the work of the social theorist Michel Foucault).

The social peer-to-peer pressure of a group, even if it is initially only virtual, may rapidly enforce and normalise radicalised attitudes. Normalisation, in the sociological tradition, refers to social processes through which ideas and actions come to be seen as normal and ‘natural’. Normalisation process theory is a middle-range theory that provides us a valuable contribution in order to better understand how a way of thinking and acting becomes incorporated in routine behaviours. Many phenomena, such us consumption of illegal substances, abuse of alcohol and adoption of deviant behaviours, can be explained by normalisation process theory.

Many life-skills mentioned in internet addiction prevention programmes, as well as the mechanisms that trigger changes of attitudes and behaviours, were found to be relevant in the prevention of risk behaviours including substance abuse, game addiction, sensation seeking and internet addiction. The same configuration of ‘Context-Mechanism–Outcome’, as suggested by the realist evaluation model (Pawson and Tilley, 1997) and by theory-driven approaches, should be investigated to understand how they could shed light on the more recent field of CVE interventions.

Internet addiction strategies are already influencing the field of violent radicalisation prevention. The following table categorises interventions according to the abovementioned classification of prevention approaches (universal, selective, etc.) and the level of
intervention (population, individual, etc.), as well as distinguishing between IAD programmes and violent radicalisation prevention/deradicalisation programmes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of intervention</th>
<th>Type of prevention</th>
<th>Internet addiction prevention programmes</th>
<th>Prevention of violent radicalisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
<td>(1) Universal</td>
<td>Learning model (Lim JS, Bae YK, Kim SS 2204)</td>
<td>Yes – guidance for teachers and schools (Scottish Department For Education and Home Office UK, 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vulnerable groups</strong></td>
<td>(2) Selective</td>
<td>School and community programmes targeting groups (e.g. peer-to-peer initiatives)</td>
<td>Yes – jail settings: programmes targeting prisoners Yes – groups of young people at risk of radicalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individuals</strong></td>
<td>(3) Indicated</td>
<td>Multilevel counselling programme (Shek, Tang, Lo 2009)</td>
<td>Yes – counselling to dissuade people from joining ISIS (Aarhus model in Denmark)49 Yes – Aarhus model in Denmark (Note 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Society</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental prevention</td>
<td>Yes – community-based approaches (Spalek 2012) Yes – Aarhus model in Denmark (Note 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organisational contexts</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An example of universal prevention (type 1) aimed indirectly at the wider population of students (and teachers) is the guideline of the Scottish Department for Education and Home Office (2015) about how social media is used to encourage travel to Syria and Iraq. The guideline targets schools and teachers and includes schools’ safeguarding procedures to prevent radicalisation.

The ‘normalisation process theory’ and the Theory of Planned Behaviours are medium-range theories which have been widely adopted to design universal, selected and indicated prevention programmes.

They provide a framework for the design, implementation and evaluation of complex interventions aiming to modify people’s behaviour: to promote healthy lifestyles, to modify clinical practices of GPs (Murray et al. 2010), and to counter and reduce the influence of messages designed to radicalise and recruit young people through the internet.

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49 Schyns and Müllerleile (undated).
3.3. Restorative justice strategies

Evidence has emerged in favour of restorative justice approaches compared with traditional measures: a meaningful corpus of studies report negative impacts of traditional measures compared with alternative\textsuperscript{50} or preventive interventions,\textsuperscript{51} including with regard to cost-benefits analyses.\textsuperscript{52}

Restorative justice, as well other alternative approaches to the traditional juvenile justice system (based on the detention model and criminal proceedings), has been the topic of a number of evaluations dating back to the 1990s.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{50} Sherman et al., *Preventing Crime: What works, what doesn’t, what’s promising*. A report to the United States Congress for the National Institute of Justice, 1995;


Restorative justice involves the legitimate stakeholders of a crime in the process and has been defined as:

> a process to involve, to the extent possible, those who have a stake in a specific offense to collectively identify and address harms, needs and obligations in order to heal and put things as right as possible (Zehr, 2002:40).

According to the principle of ‘engagement’, the different parties affected by the crime (offenders, their respective family members, and members of the community) are given significant roles in the justice process (Zehr, 2002:40).

While the criminal justice system is founded more on the principle of retribution, restorative justice as a way of restoring relationships is founded on the idea that as crime hurts, justice should heal. It therefore focuses on building relationships among individuals and the community (Llewellyn 2006). It emphasises one fundamental fact: that crime damages people, communities and relationships (Price, 2001; Braithwaite, 2004; Llewellyn, 2006). The focus is on healing rather than punishing; healing the victim and undoing the hurt and healing the offenders by rebuilding their moral and social selves, and thus healing the community at large (Michael Wenzel 2008).

### 3.3.1. Restorative justice theories and principles

First and foremost, restorative justice is a theory of justice that emphasises repairing the harm caused by crime. There is a strong link between restorative justice and respect for human rights – indeed, many international and European human rights resolutions suggest the use of restorative justice approaches in reaction to criminal offences (e.g. the European Convention on Human Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). Restorative justice values and principles are coherent with: the rights to dignity, respect and protection; the right to recognition; the rights to freedom of speech and participation, security and justice; and the rights to personal growth and empowerment.

According to van Ness (2002:2), restorative justice is driven primarily by a number of common values and by the following three principles:

1. Justice requires that we work to restore those who have been injured by crime (victims, offenders and communities);
2. Victims, offenders and communities should have opportunities to actively participate in the restorative justice process as early and as fully as possible;
3. In promoting justice, the government is responsible for preserving order and the community for establishing peace.

Two different notions of justice affect responses to rule-breaking: restorative and retributive justice. For a proper restorative justice intervention, it is crucial that there is a process of deliberation that emphasises healing rather than punishment, specifically:

> healing the victim and undoing the hurt; healing the offender by rebuilding his or her moral and social selves; healing communities and mending social relationships (Braithwaite, 2002).
While retributive justice mainly seeks to provide justice through imposition of punishment by unilateral decision, restorative justice considers the repair of justice to be an affirmation of shared values through a bilateral process (Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather and Platow, 2007).

Offences are to be considered conflicts that rightfully belong to victims and offenders, and therefore both the parties ought to participate in their resolution. However, victim-offender mediation is a voluntary restorative justice process and the offenders, as well the victims, are not pushed or obliged to adhere to the programme. The aim of the programme is to ensure that offenders take responsibility for their actions and develop awareness; it is therefore necessary to work together to rebuild trust.

In line with self-categorisation theory (Turner, 1987), the aim of solving the conflict and achieving consensus among the parties (offender and victim) is based on the view that the parties share a relevant social identity.

3.3.2. Restorative justice tools and interventions

Restorative justice developed out of the early experience of Howard Zehr with the so called victim-offender reconciliation programme (VORP). This programme, and other programmes called Victim-Offender Mediation (VOM) or dialogue programmes, bring together the offender(s), the victim(s) and community members who have also been touched by the crime (e.g. disruption of a public good, vandalism) or are in touch with the victim (parents, friends, colleagues, etc.) and the offender.

Programmes that can be embraced by large communities are based on number of components. The main theoretical paradigms of restorative justice are:

1. VOM and conflict resolution
2. Family/group conferencing or counselling
3. Restorative conferencing
4. Conferencing or circle process
5. Repairing the harm through voluntary activities in favour of the community

Restorative justice programmes offer the opportunity for the victim and offender to be face-to-face in the presence of a mediator (usually social services and officers from the department of justice for minors, municipalities, non-profit organisations who have attended specific training courses), thus recognising the feelings of the victims who have previously been de-humanised by the offender.

Moreover, practical measures such as voluntary activities in favour of the community (e.g. in associations that work with immigrants, disadvantaged people and disabled children) are scheduled by social services in order to promote a change in attitude and a symbolic return or reparation of broken relationships with the community (Leone 2010). Forgiveness, which is often emphasised in post-conflict situations, can also be addressed during the process of VOM (Price, 2001).
The community’s involvement is fundamental to the re-entry of the wrongdoers and acceptance the previously incarcerated back into the community.

Table 8: Restorative Justice and type of interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interventions</th>
<th>What is done</th>
<th>Situations where it can be useful</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Restorative inquiry</strong></td>
<td>Involves active listening to different viewpoints</td>
<td>• Minor disruptions and worries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Restorative discussion</strong></td>
<td>Goal is for the Dean or adult leading the restorative discussion to make the offender understand how and why they have harmed relationships</td>
<td>• Disruptive behaviours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mediation/ Conflict resolution</strong></td>
<td>Managed by an arbitrator when the parties both feel that the other one is wrong</td>
<td>• Resolving conflicts where parties involved are on equal ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Victim/ Wrongdoer mediation</strong></td>
<td>Conducted by an arbitrator (usually dean, teacher, counselor) and the young people involved in the conflict when one party admits her/his wrongdoing</td>
<td>• Efforts are devoted to helping the wrongdoer make the situation right and to listening the feelings of the victim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Circles</strong></td>
<td>Group arranged in a circle; managed by a facilitator</td>
<td>• Group conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Community building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Disruptive behaviours that are committed by different individuals and involve a larger group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Voluntary activity schemes** | Volunteering as an opportunity to restore relationships, to repair the damage to the community; provides a means to assume responsibility; serves as a human experience of being in touch with other people and developing empathic and social skills and self-efficacy; enables exploration of a positive identity, breaking the negative identification model | • Programmes addressed to minors in the penal justice sector that agree with judges and social services to be involed in the path.  
• Should not be a compulsory programme | Adapted from: Restorative Justice Strategies: [http://www.transformingconflict.org](http://www.transformingconflict.org); Leone (2010).

3.3.3. Assumptions and hypotheses of the utility of RG prevention in the CVE field

Restorative justice might contribute to counteracting radicalisation and extreme violence by providing alternative solutions. However, the idea of using restorative justice in deradicalisation programmes is not a novelty. The potential of restorative justice has already
been discussed at a recent conference of the European Forum for Restorative Justice where, for example, the use of restorative practices in the Basque country was presented and discussed.54

The African Journal on Conflict Resolution, published by the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), in 2014 devoted a volume to African case studies where restorative justice has been used for conflict resolution after civil wars, genocides and human rights violations. The volume refers to ‘popular dispute resolution mechanisms’ in Ethiopia (Batha 2014:100–101), and to the Nigerian decision to implement ‘soft’ approaches in tackling Boko Haram terrorism.

In addition, in neighbourhoods with a lack of human relationships and connections and high prevalence of social exclusion phenomena, trying to rebuild relationships would be more beneficial than incarceration. Most radicalised youngsters in EU countries are novices who do not have a firm background in the Muslim religion and have experienced problems of social exclusion. They generally do not speak or read Arabic and have usually been exposed to the Isis propaganda through other extremists. Restorative justice would give the offender a chance to face up to their responsibilities and realise the repercussions of their actions.

**Use of restorative justice to promote deradicalisation**

Social reintegration is not an easy feat and would require extensive psychosocial support delivered by a network of educational bodies, and by the penal justice system. This is because:

> Once aroused, the urge to violence triggers certain physical changes that prepare men’s bodies for battle. This set toward violence lingers on (Girard 1977).

The use of restorative justice programmes could drive a shift from countering violent radicalisation to promoting deradicalisation.

These programmes have been used to help child soldiers that undergo rehabilitation and reintegration, and similar processes could be designed for radicalised young people (Wessells, 2005). It is not necessary to involve the direct victim id it still do not exist.

**Social exclusion and restorative justice to prevent violent radicalisation**

A large number of studies demonstrated that wider problems of social exclusion, marginalisation and racism may act as catalysts for radicalisation (Angus, 2016). Social exclusion may render some individuals more susceptible to radicalisation and more vulnerable to violent extremism. Violent extremist propaganda is, in fact, designed to provide such audiences with a ‘competitive system of meaning’ and Islamist propagandists select susceptible individuals, offering them rewards in terms of feelings of pride, a sense of belonging to a sub-community, and a strong sense of identity.55

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55 The Youth Justice Board of the Welsh government identified ‘emotional vulnerability’ as a key risk factor that may predispose Muslim involvement in terrorism, including feelings of anger, alienation, disenfranchisement, shame, guilt and vulnerability. These emotions may be exacerbated when linked...
Young people at risk of being radicalised (particularly in some EU countries) are often individuals who have had their self-esteem eroded and are searching for a sense of identity. The ISIS narrative gives them a purpose and makes them part of a greater goal, thus giving them a sense of belonging and a way to act on their resentment and desire for revenge (Benali, 2015; Benhold, 2015; Mooney, 2014).

Rehabilitation of this type of radicalised individual, as is the case with other wrongdoers involved in restorative justice programmes, can only work if we make the assumptions that:

1. The individual has the opportunity to choose between two different options: traditional justice and a restorative justice programme;
2. The individual participates in the restorative justice programme on a voluntary basis (albeit not necessarily with a strong initial commitment);
3. The individual can be convinced to stop their association with terrorist organisations and to relinquish their commitment to those organisations (Mullins, 2010);
4. The programme is able to support the offender through the satisfaction of emotional and social needs (e.g. sense of identity, recognition by a community, gaining a higher level of self-esteem).

Moreover, recruiters tend to play on young people’s sense of victimisation, social injustice, idealism and commitment to their religion. They are made to view the use of violence as the only means of achieving their goals. Furthermore, they stop viewing their adversary as human and thus release themselves from the responsibility for the atrocities that they commit (Wessells, 2005).

to feelings of being culturally uprooted or displaced and searching for spiritual guidance, and often arise during times of transition where challenges, such as an identity crisis, enhance susceptibility to extremism.
References


Spalek, B. (2012). *Counter-Terrorism: Community-Based Approaches to preventing terror crime*. Palgrave Macmillan.


